Share This

Showing posts with label Currency war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Currency war. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

U.S. Treasury Sticks It To The China Haters

Treasury says it again, China  not manipulating its currency.

This is getting better and better.

On the market side, the China haters are looking more and more ridiculous. Not that I’m a China bull. I’m not smart enough to say that. And I have money in China. But I am smart enough and am surrounded by even smarter people who have led me to believe there is no hard landing.  So on the market side, the China naysayers are wrong.

On the political side, the China haters who think the country is stealing all our Nike shoe and Optimus Prime assemblying jobs thanks to their currency manipulation are also wrong. For the second time this year, the U.S. Treasury Department said in its report to Congress on international economic and exchange rate policies that, wait for it…China is not a currency manipulator.  The two or three guys advising Mitt Romney on China were wronger than Tim Tebow starting as QB for the Jets.

“The Treasury Department once again made the right call on China’s currency policy in its report to Congress. Labeling China a currency ‘manipulator’ would do little to help us reach the goal of a fully convertible currency and market-driven exchange rate for China,” said John Frisbie, president of the U.S. China Business Council, a lobby of multinationals working in China.

“Adding the very public ‘manipulator’ tag might simply produce pressure within China to slow down progress on this (forex) issue,” he said in a statement Tuesday.

China’s exchange rate has strengthened over 30 percent against the dollar over the past several years. The upshot is that the exchange rate has little to do with the U.S. trade balance or employment. Even as the renmimbi weakened, the U.S. trade deficit with China worsened.

Of course, not being a currency manipulator doesn’t mean that the renmimbi (RMB) is properly valued.

From the report:

The renminbi has appreciated by 9.3 percent in nominal terms and 12.6 percent in real terms against the dollar since June 2010. China’s trade and current account surpluses both have fallen to 2.6 percent of GDP from peaks of 8.8 and 10.1 percent of GDP, respectively.  The Chinese authorities have substantially reduced the level of official intervention in exchange markets since the third quarter of 2011, and China has taken a series of steps to liberalize controls on capital movements, as part of a broader plan to move to a more flexible exchange rate regime.  In light of these developments, Treasury has concluded that the standards identified in Section 3004 of the Act during the period covered in this Report have not been met with respect to China. Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests the RMB remains significantly undervalued, and further appreciation of the RMB against the dollar and other major currencies is warranted.” China’s real effective exchange rate (REER) – a measure of its overall cost-competitiveness relative to its trading partners – has appreciated since China initiated currency reform in mid-2005, after declining between 2001 and 2005. From July 2005 to October 2012, China’s real effective exchange rate appreciated by 27 percent. The REER appreciated particularly rapidly in the last several months of 2011, resulting in total REER appreciation of 6.2 percent over the course of 2011. Over the ten months of 2012, China’s REER has been unchanged.

The International Monetary Fund concluded that the RMB was moderately undervalued against a broad basket of currencies, and said that the RMB was undervalued by between 5 and 10 percent as of July 2012.

Reserve accumulation, an indicator of the degree of Chinese intervention in the currency market, has slowed markedly since the third quarter of 2011 as China buys less U.S. debt.

Even with the reduced pace of dollar accumulation, China’s official foreign exchange reserves remain exceptionally high compared to those of other economies, and well beyond established benchmarks of reserve adequacy. As of end-September 2012, the PBOC held $3.3 trillion in foreign reserves, equivalent to 42 percent of China’s GDP, or about $2,440 for every Chinese citizen. 

10 Things “The End of Cheap China” Means for You
Getty Images North America Your espresso will get more expensive . . .

Saturday, January 28, 2012

Yuan or not to Yuan? Yuan way to new monetary order

  A 'grown-up' yuan means a more stable world economy

WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

CHINESE New Year has come and will soon go. The eurozone debt crisis is well past two years. Yet uncertainty persists. The World Bank's January 2012 Global Economic Prospects reports:
:
:

World economy has entered a very difficult phase characterised by significant downside risks and fragility and as a result, forecasts have been significantly downgraded. However, even achieving these much weaker outturns is very uncertain Overall, global economic conditions are fragile.”

This week's IMF World Economic Outlook says more of the same: “The global recovery is threatened by intensifying strains in the euro area and fragilities elsewhere.” China, India, South Africa and Brazil have entered a slowing phase.

No country and no region can escape the consequences of a serious downturn. Nevertheless, growth in the East Asia and Pacific region (excluding Japan) is expected to slowdown to about 7.8% in 2012 (8.4% in 2011) and stabilise in 2013.

This reflects continuing strong domestic demand (evident in third quarter or 3Q 2011 GDP) while exports will slow to about 2% due to Europe heading towards recession and sluggish rich “Organisation For Economic Coercion And Direction (OECD)” demand.

The middle-income nations are, I think, in a good position to weather the global slowdown, with significant space available for fiscal relaxation, adequate room for interest rate easing, ample high reserves and rather strong underpinning for domestic demand to rise.

I see the modest easing in China's growth being counterbalanced by a pick-up in GDP gains in 2013 over the rest of the region. Outside China, growth has slackened sharply to 4.8% in 2011 (6.9% in 2010), but is expected to strengthen in 2012, reaching 5.8% in 2013.

China

GDP growth in China, which accounts for 80% of the region, had eased to about 9.1% in 2011 (10.4% in 2010) and is expected to slacken further to a still robust 8.2%-8.4% in 2012.

The World Bank projections point to growth moderating at 8.3% in 2013, in line with its longer-term potential GDP. Expansion is expected to emanate from domestic demand, with private spending and fixed capital outlays contributing most of the growth in 2012.

For China, the health of the global economy and high-income Europe in particular, represents the key risk at this time. Domestic risks include property overheating, local government indebtedness, and bloating bank balance sheets.

The 4Q 2011 growth of 8.9% annoy investors who are looking for indications either weak enough to justify further policy easing or strong enough to allay fears of a hard landing. Bear in mind the forecast growth for 2012 will be the weakest in a decade, and may cool further as exports slump.

The Chinese economy is buffeted by two very different forces: (i) slow global growth will hurt Chinese exports (especially to its largest trading partner, European Union) which rose by 7% in December, and exporters foresee more trouble ahead; however, (ii) analysts point to strong retail sales (up 18% in December) reflecting rising wages and domestic spending which represented about 52% of GDP in the first quarter, higher than in 2009-11.

China is counting on its massive effort to build low-income “social housing” to provide enough demand to keep the real-estate market from collapsing.

It is unclear whether China can accelerate this program to build 36 million subsidised housing by 2015enough to house all of Germany's households. But financial markets are anticipating worse news ahead. After all, the Shanghai Composite Index fell 21% in 2011. As the adage goes, stock analysts did forecast 10 of the past 3 recessions!



The yuan

Appreciation of the yuan (renmimbiRMB) against the US dollar in 2012 is expected to slow to about 3%, from +4.7% in 2011. The yuan closed at 6.3190 at end 2011, up about 8% compared with June 10 (when China effectively ended its 2-year long peg to the US dollar and has gained 30% since mid-2005 when it was last revalued.

The slowdown reflects growing demand for the US dollar amid uncertainty, lower growth, diminishing trade surplus, and growing US military presence in Asia, according to China's Centre for Forecasting Science (of the Chinese Academy of Sciences) which reports directly to the State Council, China's Cabinet.

Much of it will be in the latter year as China is likely to keep the yuan relatively stable in the first half to allow time to assess the impact of goings-on in the euro-zone. Dollars are pumped in via state banks, providing markets with a clear signal it will not allow the yuan to depreciate, while not in a hurry to let it appreciate either. The yuan has since moved sideways.

Off-shore yuan

To make the yuan a true reserve currency, China begun to liberalise currency controls and encourage an offshore yuan market in Hong Kong, creating an outlet for moving the currency across borders. However, foreign investors in China have been slow in using the yuan.

In practice, it is still difficult to buy & sell yuan because of paperwork & bureaucracy. It is still easier to settle in US dollar as it is the universal practice. Its convenience outweighs the potential costs of any unfavourable move in the US dollar-yuan rate. Nonetheless, China is encouraging more businesses to use the yuan and more US banks to step-up their yuan-settlement business.

This market will grow as China diligently moves to internationalise its currency. Encouraged by the authorities, a vibrant offshore yuan market has blossomed in Hong Kong. Beijing still controls the currency and how the yuan bought in Hong Kong can be brought back to China.

Yuan deposits in Hong Kong rose more than 4 times to 622.2b yuan (nearly US$100bil) at end September 2011 from a year earlier according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and now account for 10.4% of bank deposits.

Growth in offshore yuan stalled in late 2011 as China slowed its currency appreciation against the dollar. Given Beijing's gradualist approach to reform, the market will soon revive.

An audience poll at the recent 2012 Asian Financial Forum in London indicated 63% believes full yuan convertibility is more than 5-years away.

The very fact that London wants to be a yuan-trading centre now says a lot. Only 10% of China's international trade is settled in yuan, rising to 15% in 2012. It's still a small market in the global context.

The yuan is used for just 0.29% of all global payments in November 2011 according to financial messaging network Swift. By comparison, the euro's share is about 40%.

Dim-sum bonds

A booming business in dim-sum bonds (offshore yuan denominated bonds) followed, with companies including Caterpillar and McDonalds issuing such bonds. In September 2011, a spurt of capital flight towards “safe haven” assets in the US tied to the worsening debt crisis in Europe caused currencies of emerging nations to depreciate against the US dollar.

In East Asia, modest declines were recorded compared with South Africa (the rand fell 22%) and Brazil (the real dropped 18%). Only the Indonesia rupiah (down 5.8%) and the Malaysia ringgit (fell 5.4%) come under some pressure.

This event slowed the appreciation of the yuan and with it, trading in dim-sum bonds eased as investors were no longer in a hurry to invest. Over the medium-term, most analysts expect this yuan market to grow in the face of its massive US$3.18 trillion in reserves, as China moves to build its international status.

When dim-sum bonds started to hit the market in 2010, investors were enthusiastic, bidding up prices and driving down yields. But in the second half of 2011, the average price of investment grade dim-sum bonds fell 3.3%, amid a broad flight towards quality spooked by euro-zone turmoil and Chinese accounting scandals.

Bankers hope new entrants (private banks, commercial banks, mutual funds & life insurers) will give the market more stability this year. They would add depth & breath to the market, which tripled to 185b yuan (US$30bil) in dim-sum bonds issued in 2011. Expectations are for such bond issuance to reach 240 billion yuan this year, as new issuers (including more foreign companies) join early adopters such as government entities & state run banks.

This offshore bond market has developed well over the past year. Investor diversification in both types & geographics is still evolving, which is key to the healthy growth of the market. Equally important, investors look to the continuing appreciation of the yuan.

In addition, its average yield has risen to 3.8% (from 2.35% since mid 2011) and most now trade at higher yields than comparable US dollar bonds.

This rise in yields reflects expectation for (i) slower yuan appreciation; (ii) increase in supply; and (iii) investors desire for a higher liquidity premium during market downturns. Overall, the dim-sum market is turning into a buyer's market.

Bilateral arrangements

China is forging ahead in laying the groundwork to internationalise the yuan via bilateral arrangements with foreign companies, nations & financial centers, particularly Hong Kong (mainly because it can fully control the terms of the market). More mainland-based financial institutions will be able to issue yuan denominated bonds in Hong Kong.

This is part of a broader effort, first started in July 2009 when it encouraged enterprises in Shanghai & Guangzhou province to use the yuan when settling trade with Hong Kong, Macau and some foreign companies (see my column “China: RMB Flexibility Not Enough” of July 3, 2010).

The post-X'mas direct yuan-yen trade deal forms part of a wide-ranging currency arrangement between China & Japan to give the use of the yuan a big boost. After all, China is Japan's largest trading partner with 26.5 trillion yen in 2-way transactions last year. Encouraging direct settlement in bypassing the US dollar would reduce currency risks and trading costs. Also, Japan will buy up to US$10bil in yuan bonds for its reserves even though it represents no more than 1% of Japan's US$1.3 trillion reserves. And, it is now easier for companies to convert Chinese and Japanese funds directly into each other without an intermediate conversion to US dollar. About 60% of China-Japan trade is settled in US dollar, a well-established practice.

The package allows Japan backed institutions to sell yuan bonds in the mainland (instead of Hong Kong) helping to open China's capital market.

In recent weeks, China has taken new steps to promote the use of yuan overseas, including allowing foreign firms to invest yuan accumulated overseas in mainland China; widening the People's Bank of China (its central bank) network of currency swaps with other central banks to enable their banks to supply yuan to their customers, including with Thailand, South Korea and New Zealand totalling 1.2 trillion yuan.

It already has completed arrangements with the big Asean counterparts. Berry Eichengreen (University of California at Berkeley) observed: “Japan appears to be acknowledging implicitly that there will be a single dominant Asian currency in the future and it won't be the yen.”

But Harvard's Jeffrey Frankel is more down to earth: “This hastens a multicurrency world, but this is just one of 100 steps along the way.”

China still has a way to go in: (i) getting the yuan fully convertible (ii) reducing exchange rate interventions (iii) liberalising interest rates, and (iv) reforming the banking system. In all, so the yuan can really trade freely.

What to do?

The China-Japan deal points the way, nudging the yuan towards the inevitable becoming a reserve currency alongside now discredited US dollar and the euro. This is to be welcomed by all.

China must realise a fully internationalised yuan should be free to float (and to appreciate) part of its overall reform. Over the longer term, though, avoiding huge imbalances is good for everyone, not least China. While it is understandable for its Prime Minister to label China today as “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable,” opportunities to take advantage of new openings don't come often.

Alexander Gerschenkron, my professor at Harvard (in my view, the best economic historian of his time) points to economies like China as having “advantages in backwardness,” including China's ability to weather shocks: high reserves, robust fiscal situation and comfortable external position.

Shakespeare's Hamlet sums it up best: “If it be not now, yet it will come - the readiness is all.” A grown-up yuan is good for China's welfare.

It also means a more stable world economy which benefits the United States. For China, there will never be enough cushion. Politicians need to seize the moment and act boldly.

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching & promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my


To Yuan or not to Yuan, that is the question

The government of Zimbabwe is considering using China's Yuan as their national currency.

China has reportedly been offered mining rights by Mugabe, despite protests [EPA]
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe - From downtown shops that stock cheap clothing and shoes that fall apart after one wear, to mining concessions in platinum, gold and diamonds - the Chinese finger is now in virtually every Zimbabwean pie.

From city sidewalks to low-income suburbs, the Chinese have become part of the local population, and if some senior government bureaucrats have their way, the country could soon find itself adopting the Chinese Yuan as its official currency.

For some influential monetary policy czars, the massive assailing of the Zimbabwean economy by the Chinese now only requires the Yuan to strengthen these economic reconstruction efforts.

Invited by President Robert Mugabe as part of his infamous 2004 "Look East" policy to help drive the economy and employment creation, after relations with former traditional investment partners the European Union and United States soured, China has been able to create its own little sphere of influence and establish an ubiquitous presence in Zimbabwe.




Zimbabwe looks to China for economic revival
This is despite being unpopular with Zimbabwe's industrial and commercial players - and general members of the public who accuse the Chinese of poor labour practices and shoddy goods and services.

Late in 2011, Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono, seen by many as a close ally of Mugabe, announced he was in favour of having the Chinese Yuan as the country's official currency. After the Zimbabwean dollar was suspended in 2008, the country has been using a multi-currency regime, which includes the use of the US dollar, the South African rand and the Botswana pula.

According to Gono, the Chinese Yuan would be introduced alongside the Zimbabwean dollar. Mugabe's political supporters have been calling for currency reforms to bring back the Zimbabwean dollar.

"With the continuous firming of the Chinese Yuan, the US dollar is fast ceasing to be the world's reserve currency and the eurozone debt crisis has made things even worse," Gono told state media in November.
"As a country, we still have the opportunity to avoid being caught napping, by adopting the Chinese Yuan as part of consolidating the country's 'Look East' policy.

"It's only recently when we had the startling revelations, with Angola offering to bail out her former colonial master Portugal from her debt crisis. This can also happen with Zimbabwe if we choose the right path," Gono added.

He continued: "If we continue with our 'Look East' policy, it will not be long [until] we will also be volunteering to bail out Britain from her debt crisis, and I will not wait for my creator's day before this happens. There is no doubt that the Yuan, with its ascendancy, will be the 21st century's world reserve currency."

'Handing over' the country?

Officials from Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front see huge potential in using the Yuan, citing the growth of the Chinese economy under BRICS, which brings together emerging global economic powerhouses Brazil, India, China and South Africa.

But not everyone is as upbeat about such prospects.

There are concerns that this could mean "handing over" the country to the Chinese, who already have been offered huge mining rights by Mugabe - despite protests from his coalition government partners. The country's finance minister, Tendai Biti, has said that Mugabe was forfeiting state resources to China, whom critics are calling "Africa's new coloniser".

Economist Eric Bloch said "it is not practical" for Zimbabwe to adopt the Chinese Yuan.

"Zimbabwe won't have any interaction with international markets, as the US dollar remains the standard currency in international trade," Bloch explained.

With China increasingly being touted to overtake the US as the world's largest economy, the temptation to embrace all things Chinese has proven too much to resist for poor economies across the globe, contends Tafara Zivanayi, an economics lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe.

"There has been false hope given to Chinese economic growth, with many African countries imagining they can transfer this growth to their own economies," Zivanayi said.

"Such decisions (to adopt a foreign currency) as usually based on international trade indices and monetary policies of the country where the currency is domiciled. Even if there have been projections that the Chinese economy will surpass the US economy, this won't happen overnight," Zivanayi said.

"There are still concerns about Chinese penetration of international, especially low income, markets and creating wealth for itself and not host countries," Zivanayi said.

Even traders who have long ridiculed cheap Chinese products and have no grasp of international trade intricacies find themselves offering opinions about the prospects of adopting the Chinese Yuan.

"As long as things have worked fine for us using the American dollar, why change that formula?" asked Thabani Moyo, a commuter omnibus driver. His colleagues, who are struggling to handle giving change in the basket of currencies they receive, nodded in agreement.

Gono and other opponents of US currency cited this lack of change in coins as a reason why Zimbabwe needed to adopt a single currency or revert to its own, previously useless, dollar.

However, during the presentation of the national budget for the 2012 fiscal year, Biti told parliament that Zimbabwe would continue using US currency until the economy stabilised.

Not everyone supports the introduction of the Chinese Yuan. "We want real money, not zhing-zhong," taxi driver Jourbet Buthelezi said, referring to the pejorative term Zimbabweans use for sub-standard Chinese goods.

A version of this article was first published on Inter Press Service.
Source:
IPS

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

The Exchange Rate Delusion of US Trade Deficit !


Michael Spence: The Exchange-Rate Delusion


A 100 yuan banknote (R) is placed next to a US$100 banknote. -- PHOTO : REUTERS >>

If one looks at the trade patterns of the global economy's two biggest players, two facts leap out.

One is that, while the United States runs a trade deficit with almost everyone, including Canada, Mexico, China, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, not to mention the oil-exporting countries, the largest deficit is with China.

If trade data were re-calculated to reflect the country of origin of various components of value-added, the general picture would not change, but the relative magnitudes would: higher US deficits with Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, and a dramatically lower deficit with China.

The second fact is that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan - all relatively high-income economies - have a large trade surplus with China. Germany has relatively balanced trade with China, even recording a modest bilateral surplus in the post-crisis period.

The US has a persistent overall trade deficit that fluctuates in the range of 3-6 per cent of GDP. But, while the total reflects bilateral deficits with just about everyone, the US Congress is obsessed with China, and appears convinced that the primary cause of the problem lies in Chinese manipulation of the renminbi's exchange rate.

One problem with this view is that it cannot account for the stark differences between the US and Japan, Germany, and South Korea. Moreover, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the renminbi is now rising quickly, owing to inflation differentials and Chinese wage growth, particularly in the country's export sectors. That will shift the Chinese economy's structure and trade patterns quite dramatically over time.

The final-assembly links of global-value added chains will leave China for countries at earlier stages of economic development, such as Bangladesh, where incomes are lower (though without producing much change in the balance with the US).

A somewhat more sensible concern might be that the dollar's reserve-currency status causes it to be 'over-valued' with respect to every currency, not just the renminbi. That could create additional pressure on the tradable part of the US economy, and thus might help to explain why the US tradable sector has not generated net employment for two decades.



But, in order to explain performance relative to Japan and Germany, one would have to argue that the euro and the yen have been undervalued, which makes no sense.

In fact, the employment generated by the tradable sector has been in services at the upper end of the distributions of value-added per person, education, and income. As a result, growth and employment in the tradable sector have gone separate ways, with healthy growth and stagnant employment. In Germany, by contrast, the tradable sector is an employment engine. The same is true of Japan.

The US economy's distinctive features for at least a decade prior to the crisis that began in 2008 were an unsustainably high level of consumption, owing to an illusory wealth effect, under-investment (including in the public sector), and savings that fell short of the investment deficiency. That excess household and government consumption fueled the domestic economy - and much of the global economy as well.

In several European countries that now confront fiscal and growth challenges, the pattern was somewhat different: most of the excess consumption and employment was on the government side. But the effect was similar: an unsustainable pattern of income and employment generation, and lower productivity and competitiveness in these economies' tradable sectors, leading to trade deficits, stunted GDP, and weak job creation.

One could argue that the euro has been and still is overvalued, and that this has hindered many eurozone economies' productivity relative to non-eurozone countries. But the relative productivity deficiencies within the eurozone are more important for growth, and have nothing to do with the exchange rate.

 Excessive Focus on currencies

The focus on currencies as a cause of the West's economic woes, while not entirely misplaced, has been excessive. Developing countries have learned over time that real income growth and employment expansion are driven by productivity gains, not exchange-rate movements. This, in turn, requires public and private investment in tangible assets, physical and telecommunications infrastructure, human capital and skills, and the knowledge and technology base of the economy.

Of course, it is possible for a country's terms of trade to get out of line with income and productivity levels, requiring a rebalancing. But resetting the terms of trade is no substitute for tackling the structural underpinnings of productivity.

None of this is peculiar to developing countries. Underinvestment has long-term costs and consequences everywhere. Excess consumption merely hides these costs temporarily.

In the US, productivity deficiencies have led to a pattern of disconnection from global supply chains. So the challenge for America is not only to restore productivity, but also to restore its links to the main currents of world trade.

China's growth - and, more generally, that of the major emerging economies - provides a substantial potential tailwind. That is certainly true nowadays for Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The US and others can take advantage of it as well, but only if productivity relative to income levels in specific areas of potential competitiveness begin to rise.

As long as America economic policy remains focused primarily on deficits, domestic demand, exchange rates, and backsliding on trade openness, its investment deficiencies will remain unaddressed. That means that its employment and income-distribution problems will remain unaddressed as well.

The good news is that, at a deep level, incentives across advanced and developing countries are aligned. The emerging economies would like nothing more than the restoration of sustainable patterns of growth in the advanced economies, and are prepared to be cooperative players in that process. But focusing on these countries' exchange rates is not the right way to go about it.

Michael Spence, a Nobel laureate in economics, is Professor of Economics at New York University's Stern School of Business, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. His latest book is The Next Convergence - The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World (www.thenextconvergence.com).