Up Close and Personal with Steve Forbes

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By TEE LIN SAY and JOHN LOH starbiz@thestar.com.my

BORN: July 18, 1947
MARITAL STATUS: Married with 5 daughters.
Just celebrated his 40 th anniversary
HIGHEST QUALIFICATION: B.A in History from
Princet on in 1970
CAREER: Editor-In-chief of Forbes media,
president and CEO of Forbes Inc
FAVOURITE FOOD: Lamb chop, french fries
and cheese burgers. All the things that are bad!
FAVOURITE PLACE: Bicycle riding and
collecting letters and original manuscripts from
Winston Churchill, among others.
RELIGION: Presbyterian
POLITICAL PARTY: Republican

STEVE Forbes probably knows of the familiar Chinese saying that wealth does not pass three generations. Whether he believes it or not, given the onslaught traditional media have been facing in recent years, one wonders if that ominous saying has more than a tinge of truth to it.

He has grounds to be worried, though. The Forbes family business is now into its third generation. The publishing business was started by B.C. Forbes who then handed it over to his son Malcom Forbes and is currently under the stewardship of Steve Forbes.

Judging by the statistics, Forbes is taking on the proverb head on.

The company's flagship publication, Forbes, is the United States' leading business magazine with a circulation of more than 900,000. Forbes, Forbes Asia and the company's licensee editions together reach a worldwide audience of more than six million readers. The circulation of Forbes' international editions is 590,500.

“The tools have changed tremendously because of the Web. However, the purpose remains the same. We were the early embracers of the Web, and we did not confuse purpose and method. That is why in the United States there is no magazine that has done as well as ours on the Web,” said Forbes.

“It is because of this that we are able to put out more content. Ninety-eight per cent of our content doesn't appear in our magazine. Our early embrace of the Web has resulted in us having 20 million unique visitors a month and the number is growing in terms of usage. Our affiliated sites receive five million to six million visitors,” says Forbes.



Apart from having its own staff of journalists, Forbes also has 800 contributors for its website chosen by its channel contributors.

“No one is doing it on a scale as we are. The bottom line is, we believe the entrepreneurial class is growing around the world. That's what people want to know. The Web has enabled us to do things with more versatility and flexibility,” says Forbes.

On Money

Though born into money in Morristown, New Jersey, Forbes displayed from an early age that ink did run through his veins as he showed an aptitude to run a publishing business.

Graduated cum laude in 1966 from Brooks School, Massachusetts, Forbes, while studying at Princeton, founded his first magazine, Business Today, with two other students. Business Today is currently the largest student-run magazine in the world.

When asked what he loves more journalism or business and investing Forbes simply says he loves both but is quick to note that money is not everything.

“It is an effort for reward. It is a means of doing transactions. It is a facilitator and gives us the ability to invest for the future. Money puts things in a proper perspective,” he muses.

His first memory of money was as a small boy who never had enough allowance for toys and candies. Forbes had to complete his chores to earn money.

Image via Wikipedia

“So, my effort for reward was established at a fairly young age. To get money, you have to meet the needs and wants of other people. Sometimes you have to give them things they didn't know they wanted. The key thing is creativity. Money doesn't just come to you,” he says.

He believes, though, that people have to invest. That is key.

“If you look around the world today, there are great equity opportunities. It is precisely in terrible times like these that you can get enormous bargains.”

He adds that the time to get into the market is when everyone is getting out. “You do it when the clouds and storms are there. When the storm is gone, everyone will see what you saw,” says Forbes.

He cites the period between the late 1970s and the early 1980s when the global economy was in a troubled state. It started to sputter and then recovered in the late eighties. Between the 1990s and and the early part of the 21st century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had grown 15-fold.

“The wealth of the world has increased. We've had great advances in technology and what's holding us back is the convulsions and distortions in the US dollar. I think when we get a new president, that will change. If we can get through the next one-and-a-half years, I think reforms will be made and better times are coming,” he said.

On Europe's debt problems, Forbes says Europe's woes will persist in the short term especially if the Europeans continue with their “incompetencies in handling the crisis”.

“Europe should be doing what we did in the United States in 2008. They should be having their own Troubled Asset Relieve Programme. If necessary, pump capital into banks. That is why they bail out countries like Greece, not because Greece is important, but because their banks are holding Greek papers and bonds. Hence, Europe has to focus on shoring up its capital,” he said.

He believes though that the axe would have to fall on some of Europe's banks and that Europe needs to have a programme where it does not let the good banks go down with the bad.

“Europe has to restructure its debts, instead of pretending Greece can pay those loans. They cannot. Restructure the debts. Don't just focus on austerity. You also focus on growth to make sure the economy grows again. Greece is now increasing taxes, which is the dumbest thing you could do. They should reform tax code, put in the flat tax. They should also make it easier to set up businesses in Greece,” he argues.

Principles in life

Forbes says an important thing in life is to have an ability to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong, and he has three “F” principles faith, family and friends to maintain an everyday balance.

“The best thing was to have parents who already owned a successful business. My father used to say that nepotism doesn't matter as long as you keep it within the family!” Forbes says with a laugh.

“In my workplace, I am blessed to be in an area where I have always wanted to be in. It must be in the genes. When I was in school, I turned out newsheets for my classmates. I also graded my teachers. I thought, if they can give me grades, why can't I grade them too? That only lasted once!” he jokes.

Forbes likes riding his bicycle and has done trips to various parts of the world with groups of people. He likes London, Paris and various places in Italy. In Asia, he likes the coastal cities in China and some in the interior as he can feel the growth and energy there. He is amazed by what Singapore has done.

His hobbies include collecting old letters and manuscripts of noteworthy individuals Sir Winston Churchill and the writings of obscure British writer John Goldsworthy.

For young entrepreneurs, Forbes has one advice: focus on value adding. The focus should be on providing something people want, or did not know they wanted before.

“You can find it even in the most common areas. Take Starbucks coffee, for instance. Everyone drinks coffee. Anyone can make it and grow it. They still serve it for free on the airlines and yet, how did Starbucks do so well? They did it differently, serving up the Viennese coffee experience,” explains Forbes.

On his political ideologies

Forbes has no qualms voicing his disapproval of US President Barack Obama. Forbes would like to see a new president who can deliver true economic growth and a stable dollar. He says the problem of the weak dollar, which started under George W. Bush, was compounded by Obama.

“We should be in a recovery by now, but instead we are like an automobile going at 10km per hour. We should be going at 120kph,” says Forbes.

Some of Obama's measures that he doesn't agree with include the binge spending and the healthcare bill.

“The healthcare bill is a disaster, which will be repealed in 2013 when the new president comes in. Obama's massive regulations are crushing the banks. And his regulations on energy he is very anti-coal, very anti everything except for windmills, which is a very medieval technology. He has not reformed the tax codes and wants to raise taxes,” says Forbes.

On Obama's recent job stimulus package, Forbes says this is spending money the United States does not have.

“Governments do not create jobs. Entrepreneurs do. He does not understand that,” says Forbes.

For his pick for president, Forbes is leaning towards Republican Governor Rick Perry. He likes Perry's record as Governor of Texas and his success in creating jobs.

“He did not raise taxes, kept the budget under control and has also put in reforms,” says Forbes.

In 1996 and 2000, Forbes campaigned vigorously for the Republican nomination for the presidency.

On why he ran twice as a presidential candidate, Forbes felt there was a vacuum in the field of candidates as more opportunities should be given the people. And his experience from that? “Its more fun to win than to lose!”

Over the next five to 10 years, Forbes hopes to be doing more of what he is doing today, which is trying to influence positive policies to enable his country and the world to grow.

European choice: Greek bailout Mark II – it’s a default !

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WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

The European debt crisis has evolved rather quickly since my last column, “Greece is Bankrupt” (July 2). The European leadership was clearly in denial. The crisis has lurched from one “scare” to another. First, it was Greece, then Ireland, then Portugal; and then back to Greece. On each occasion, European politicians muddled through, dithering to buy time with half-baked solutions: more “kicking the can down the road.” By last week, predictably, the crisis came home to roost. Financial markets in desperation turned on Italy, the euro-zone's third largest economy, with the biggest sovereign debt market in Europe. It has 1.9 trillion euros of sovereign debt outstanding (120% of its GDP), three times as much as Greece, Ireland and Portugal combined.

Over the next two weeks the EU must come up with a second Greek bailout which could be as high as £107billion on top of the £98billion in rescue loans agreed for Greece in May 

The situation has become just too serious, if contagion was allowed to fully play out. It was a reality check; a time to act as it threatened both European integration and the global recovery. So, on July 21, an emergency summit of European leaders of the 17-nation euro-currency area agreed to a second Greek bailout (Mark II), comprising two key elements: (i) the debt exchange (holders of 135 billion euros in Greek debt maturing up to 2020 will voluntarily accept new bonds of up to 15 to 30 years); and (ii) new loans of 109 billion euros (through its bailout fund and the IMF). Overall, Greek debt would fall by 26 billion euros from its total outstanding of 350 billion euros. No big deal really.

Contagion: Italy and Spain

By mid-July, the Greek debt drama had become a full-blown euro-zone crisis. Policy makers' efforts to insulate other countries from a Greek default, notably Italy and Spain, have failed. Markets panicked because of disenchantment over sloppy European policy making. For the first time, I think, investors became aware of the chains of contagion and are only now beginning to really think about them.

The situation in Italy is serious. At US$262bil, total sovereign claims by international banks on Italy exceeded their combined sovereign exposures to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which totalled US$226bil. European banks account for 90% of international banks' exposure to Italy and 84% of sovereign exposure, with French & German banks being the most exposed. Italy & Spain have together 6.3 trillion euros of public and private debt between them. Reflecting growing market unease, the yield on Italy's 10-year government bonds had risen to 5.6% on July 20, and Spain's, to 6%, against 2.76% on German comparable bunds, the widest spread ever in the euro era.

Italy and Spain face different challenges. Spain has a high budget deficit (9.2% of GDP in 2010, down from 11.1% in 2009) the target being to take it down to 6% in 2011 which assumes high implementation risks. Its debt to GDP ratio (at 64% in 2011) is lower than the average for the eurozone. The economy is only gradually recovering, led by exports. But Spain suffers from chronic unemployment (21%, with youth unemployment at 45%), weak productivity growth and a dysfunctional labour market.



It must also restructure its savings banks. Spain needs to continue with reforms; efforts to repair its economy are far from complete and risks remain considerable. Italy has a low budget deficit (4.6% of GDP) and hasn't had to prop-up its banks. But its economy has barely expanded in a decade, and its debt to GDP ratio of 119% in 2010 was second only to Greece. Italy suffers from sluggish growth, weak productivity and falling competitiveness. Its weaknesses reflect labour market rigidities and low efficiency. The main downside risk comes from turmoil in the eurozone periphery.

Another decade of stagnation also poses a major risk. But both Spain and Italy are not insolvent unlike Greece. The economies are not growing and need to be more competitive. The average maturity of their debt is a reasonable six to seven years. But the psychological damage already done to Europe's bond market cannot be readily undone.

The deal: Europeanisation of Greek debt 

The new bailout deal soughts to ring-fence Greece by declaring “Greece is in a uniquely grave situation in the eurozone. This is the reason why it requires an exceptional solution,” implying it's not to be repeated. Most don't believe it. But to its credit, the new deal cuts new ground in addition to bringing-in much needed extra cash - 109 billion euros, plus a contribution by private bondholders of up to 50 billion euros by mid-2014. For the first time, the new framework included solvent counterparties and adequate collateral. For investors, there is nothing like having Europe as the new counterparty instead of Greece. This europeanisation of the Greek debt lends some credibility to the programme. Other new features include: (i) reduction in interest rates to about 3.5% (4.5% to 5.8% now) and extension of maturities to 15 years (from 7 years), to be also offered to Ireland and Portugal; (ii) the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), its rescue vehicle, will be allowed to buy bonds in the secondary market, extend precautionary credit lines before States are shut-out of credit markets, and lend to help recapitalise banks; and (iii) buy collateral for use in the bond exchange, where investors are given four options to accept new bonds carrying differing risk profiles, worth less than their original holdings.

The IIF (Institute of International Finance), the industry trade group that negotiated for the banks, insurance funds and other investors, had estimated that one-half of the 135 billion euros to be exchanged will be for new bonds at 20% discount, giving a savings of 13.5 billion euros off the Greek debt load. Of the 109 billion euros from the new bailout (together with the IMF), 35 billion euros will be used to buy collateral to serve as insurance against the new bonds in exchange, while 20 billion euros will go to buy Greek debt at a discount in the secondary market and then retiring it, giving another savings of 12.6 billion euros on the Greek debt stock.

Impact of default

Once again, the evolving crisis was a step ahead of the politicians. There are fears that Italy and Spain could trip into double-dip recession as global growth falters, threatening the debt dynamics of both countries. This time the IMF weighed in with serious talk of contagion with widespread knock-on effects worldwide. Fear finally struck, forcing Germany and France to act, this time more seriously. The first reaction came from the credit rating agencies. Moody's downgraded Greece's rating three notches deeper into junk territory: to Ca, its second-lowest (from Caa1), short of a straight default. Similarly, Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor's have cut Greece's rating to CCC.

They have since downgraded it further. They are all expected to state Greece is in default when it begins to exchange its bonds in August for new, long-dated debt (up to 30 years) at a loss to investors (estimated at 21% of their bond holdings). The rating agencies would likely consider this debt exchange a “credit event”, but only for a limited period, I think. Greece's financial outlook thereafter will depend on whether the country would likely recover or default again. History is unkind: sovereigns that default often falters again.

What is also clear now is the new bailout would not do much to reduce Greece's huge stock of sovereign debt. At best, the fall in its debt stock will represent 12% of Greece's GDP. Over the medium term, Greece continues to face solvency challenges. Its stock of debt will still be well in excess of 130% of GDP and will face significant implementation risks to financial and economic reform. No doubt the latest bailout benefitted the entire eurozone by containing near-term contagion risks, which otherwise would engulf Europe. It did manage to provide for the time being, some confidence to investors in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy that it's not going to be a downward spiral. But the latest wave of post-bailout warnings have reignited concerns of contagion risks and revived investor caution.

Still, the bailout doesn't address the very core fiscal problems across the eurozone. This is not a comprehensive solution. It shifted additional risks towards contributing members with stronger finances and their taxpayers as well as private investors, and reduces incentives for governments to keep their fiscal affairs under strict check. This worries the Germans as it weakens the foundation of currency union based on fiscal self-discipline. Moreover, the EFSF now given more authority to intervene pre-emptively before a state gets bankrupt, didn't get more funds.

German backlash appears to be also growing. While the market appears to be moving beyond solvency to looking at potential threat to the eurozone as a whole, the elements needed to fight systemic failure are not present. At best, the deal reflected a courageous effort but fell short of addressing underlying issues, leading to fears that Greece-like crisis situations could still flare-up, spreading this time deep into the eurozone's core.

Growing pains

The excitement of the bailout blanked out an even bigger challenge that could further destabilise the eurozone sluggish growth. The July Markit Purchasing Managers Index came in at 50.8, the lowest since August 2009 and close enough to the 50 mark that divides expansion from contraction. And, way below the consensus forecast. Both manufacturing and services slackened. Germany and France expanded at the slowest pace in two years in the face of a eurozone that's displaying signs it is already contracting. Looking ahead, earlier expectations of a 2H'11 pick-up now remains doubtful.Lower GDP growth will require fiscal stimulus to fix, at a time of growing fiscal consolidation which threatens a downward spiral. At this time, the eurozone needs policies to restart growth, especially around the periphery. Without growth, economic reform and budget restraints only exacerbate political backlash and social tensions. This makes it near impossible to restore debt sustainability. Germany may have to delay its austerity programme without becoming a fiscal drag. This trade-off between growth and austerity is real.

IMF studies show that cutting a country's budget deficit by 3% points of GDP would reduce real output growth by two percentage points and raise the unemployment rate by one percentage point. History suggests growth and austerity just do not mix. In practical terms, it is harder for politicians to stimulate growth than cut debt.

Reform takes time to yield results. And, markets are fickle. In the event the market switches focus from high-debt to low-growth economies, a crisis can easily evolve to enter a new phase one that could help businesses invest and employ rather than a pre-mature swing of the fiscal axe. Timing is critical. It now appears timely for the United States and Europe to shift priorities. They can't just wait forever to rein in their debts. Sure, they need credible plans over the medium term for deficit reduction. More austerity now won't get growth going. The surest way to build confidence is to get recovery onto a sustainable path only growth can do that. Without it, the risk of a double-dip recession increases. Latest warnings from the financial markets in Europe and Wall Street send the same message: get your acts together and grow. This needs statesmanship. The status quo is just not good enough anymore.

Former banker Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British chartered scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.

When great nations go broke !

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Why Not? By Wong Sai Wan

Populist decisions and fear of election backlash are the surest way a country would go bankrupt.

TAXI drivers went on strike against the issuing of more licences as part of austerity measures adopted by the government by parking their vehicles on the highway leading to the airport.

Another government had to sell off its embassies in 11 countries to raise RM300mil because it could no longer afford to keep them.

And in a third country, the government is in a tussle with its elected representatives as the country (USA) hurdles towards defaulting on its US$14.5tril (RM43.4tril) debt.

No, none of the countries referred to is Malaysia. Instead, the striking taxi drivers were in Greece, the embassy selling country is Britain and of course with such a huge debt, the third is the United States. It’s frightening to think how these three countries – at one time or another was the greatest country of a certain generation.



In ancient time, Greece was the centre of the universe for everything ranging from democracy to sciences to world conquering feats by its leaders like Alexander the Great.

But it can no longer live on its past glories as it wallows in its own Greek tragedy.

Its economy, the 27th largest in the world, is in ruins just like the things that Greece is most famous for.

Britain – once called by everyone as the United Kingdom or Great Britain – had the largest empire in the world just a century ago with colonies in every continent. Malaysia was once its colony.

The British claimed the industrial revolution as its own and is rightly credited for turning manufacturing into becoming the mainstay of the global economy.

It is now a shadow of its glory days and at best is the rabble rousers in the European Union (EU) zone. Gone are its colonies in every far-flung corner of the world that kept its super economy running.

Now the British have even got to putting for sale its huge Chancery in Kuala Lumpur because it would be cheaper for the High Commission to operate out of a commercial building.

As for the United States, wasn’t it the leader of the free world and the fatherland of industrialisation where hardwork is always rewarded with ample financial gain?

But now the country is bogged down with wars on various fronts from Libya to Afghanistan.

Yes, the United States is still the No 1 country in the world as far as the economy size is concerned but for the first time in the past century, everyone else – especially China – is catching up quickly.

The Americans owe more money to everyone than anyone has in the past.

Go to the website http://www.usdebtclock.org/ and you will get the real time feeling of how much the land of the brave and free owe the rest of the world.

It will probably take hundreds of PhD thesis to explain what went wrong for these three nations but suffice to say that successive governments did not do enough to prevent their economies from falling into such a dark hole.

On top of that politics has played a strong role in pushing these economies into even darker places.

Political opponents in these countries, especially in the United States and Greece, have been playing a game of one-upmanship on every issue.

Even now on the brink of economic ruin, these politicians continue to play the game.

As for Greece, there are enough MPs there who want to play the popular game of not going ahead with the agreed austerity drive because it is supposedly too painful for its people.

But wasn’t it their foolhardiness that brought Greece to this position in the first place.

What was the hurry for Greece to join the single Euro monetary system? It was obvious that it was not ready to meet the standards set by the technocrats in Brussels (where the EU is headquartered). The same can be said of Ireland, Spain, Portugal and many of the old eastern block countries.

It is hoped that the Greek government will stand firm against pressures from the likes of the taxi drivers and proceed with the unpopular austerity measures.

As for the United States, the rivalry of Republicans and Demo-crats is threatening to send the world into possibly the biggest depression ever as there is less than 10 days left before America defaults on that huge debt.

The Republicans, who control the House of Representatives are refusing to approve President Barack Obama’s proposed budget on the debt ceiling because they claim it would hurt the American economy (read the rich).

If they default, the entire world can look forward to decades of depression as lenders will panic and demand all nations to repay their debts immediately.

Our national debt stood at RM233.92bil last year or 34.3% to the Growth Domestic Product.

It used to be worse but some of the debts were repaid in the last decade when the ringgit gained in strength.

Yes, surprisingly our country’s debt is not a huge mountain as some people would like us to believe, but what is worrying is the lack of support for efforts to reduce it further.

A sure way of doing it is by reducing subsidies.

In 2009, it was reported that the Government spent RM74bil in subsidies ranging from social projects to energy and food. This translates to an annual subsidy of about RM12,900 per household.

Cutting back on subsidies would be unpopular with the people. The negative reaction to the floating of the premium petrol prices and the allowing of energy prices to rise are examples of the backlash the Government has gotten from its efforts to reduce its subsidy spending.

The most popular comments against Malaysia’s spending cuts has been to ask the Government to reduce the leakages before even thinking of cutting back on subsidies.

Of course, it does not help the Government’s plans that in the past there has been ample evidence of such leakages.

Something must be done to convince the people there is a total war against wastage including using unpopular means. Why not?

After all, the most important lesson from the Greece, Britain and United States stories is that being popular will only guarantee election victories that will eventually lead to financial disasters.

> Executive editor Wong Sai Wan has been through three recessions and fears the fourth the most.

Stupid central banker tricks

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By Paul R. La Monica

The euro has rallied against the dollar despite worries about Greece as investors bet on ECB rate hikes. Click chart for more on currencies.

NEW YORK (CNNMoney) -- Greek debt crisis? What Greek debt crisis?

The European Central Bank is meeting this Thursday and is widely expected to raise interest rates by a quarter of a percentage point to 1.5%. That would be the second rate hike by the ECB this year.

Sure, the austerity vote in Greece is good news since it could mean the worst-case scenario fears about a euro meltdown may not be realized.

But this isn't the end to the difficulties in Greece. Doesn't it seem just a bit odd that the ECB is contemplating more tightening at a time when there are still legitimate worries about the problems spreading to Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain? Moody's downgraded Portugal's debt to junk status on Tuesday.

The sovereign debt woes could be disastrous news for banks in France and Germany -- the two big euro zone nations that actually have somewhat healthy economies.

But the ECB, unlike the Federal Reserve in the U.S., only has one mandate: inflation. (The Fed is charged with watching prices as well as employment.)

And even though commodity prices have come back from their peaks earlier this year, they are still somewhat alarmingly high. Crude oil, for example, has crept back above $95 a barrel. So that may be all that ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet needs to justify bumping rates up a bit.

Still, will the move backfire?

Another ECB rate hike would further widen the gap between interest rates in the euro zone and here in the United States. (They've been near zero since December 2008.) The general rule of thumb in the land of paper money is that the higher the interest rates are, the stronger the currency.

Europe cited as scariest risk to economy

But that's a problem from an inflation standpoint. With oil and many other commodities denominated in dollars, the weaker the greenback gets, the more likely it is for commodity prices to go higher.

"An ECB rate hike means a higher euro going forward," said Brian Gendreau, market strategist with Financial Network Investment Corp., a Segunda, Calif.-based advisory firm.

"It seems paradoxical that Europe, with its very serious problems, has a currency that's strong and rising but that's a reality. That means the trading bias is in favor of a lower dollar and higher oil prices," Gendreau added.

It makes you wonder if David Letterman needs to expand his stupid tricks franchise and create one specifically for central bankers.

Other currency experts wondered if the ECB should just leave well enough alone since crude prices have pulled back in the past few months after surging due to Arab Spring-inspired supply disruption fears.



"I don't think the ECB would be doing the right thing with a rate hike. Oil prices are high but inflation pressures have abated quite a bit," said Kathy Lien, director of currency research for foreign exchange brokerage GFT in Jersey City.

Lien said the ECB needs to pay more attention to slow growth in Europe -- even if it's not officially one of that central bank's particular mandates.

"Price stability is the top priority but the more important question is should the ECB be doing this during a fragile point of negotiations with Greece?" she said. "Raising rates makes financing more difficult for people in Europe."

What makes matters more vexing is the fact that it's not as if the ECB won't have other opportunities to raise rates soon if inflation does in fact pick up.

The ECB will meet again on August 4 and has another meeting scheduled for September 8. Wouldn't it be more judicious to wait for at least another month or two to see how the situation in Greece plays out before rushing to raise rates again?



"I am a little puzzled by why the ECB seems so intent on raising interest rates right now. It's not going to ease any of the problems in the peripheral euro countries," Gendreau said.

Still, some think that the ECB rate hike may be a non-event. That's because the euro has already rallied against the dollar this year despite all the negative headlines about Greece, Portugal, Ireland, etc.

"The speculation about a rate hike has been in the cards for a couple of months," said Ian Naismith, co-manager of The Currency Strategies Fund (FOREX), a Sarasota-Fla. Based mutual fund specializing in foreign exchange investments.

Naismith pointed out that just because the ECB is likely to raise rates on Thursday does not mean that this is the beginning of a long cycle of rate hikes. The key is going to be whether Trichet signals that he's still worried about inflation and that more rate increases are on the way.

"Nothing is etched in stone," Naismith said.

Let's hope so. The ECB does seem strangely hell bent on rate hikes even though Europe is still in the midst of major financial upheaval.

But the last thing Greece, other troubled European nations and the rest of the world for that matter, need is for the ECB to make matters worse with ill-timed policy decisions.

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The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Paul R. La Monica. Other than Time Warner, the parent of CNNMoney, and Abbott Laboratories, La Monica does not own positions in any individual stocks. 

Greece is bankrupt !

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WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

A rose by any other name would smell as sweet. In the case of Greece, default by any other name just stinks! The plain truth: Greece is bankrupt. Greece's sovereign debt crisis deepens daily as the gap in reality widens between politically driven “in denial” views of European Union (EU) leadership and market-place views as reflected in 5-year Greek bonds trading at a yield close to 20%; Standard & Poor cutting Greece's rating to triple-C (the lowest credit rating ever); and highest premiums payable on CDS (credit default swaps, used as insurance to protect investors against defaults) on Greek debt. Probability of default by Greece over the next 5 years has jumped to 86%.

Today, a CDS will cost US$2mil annually to insure US$10mil debt over 5 years. Markets have indicated for some time Greece suffers from a condition of bankruptcy rather than a crisis of liquidity (i.e. cash-short).

This simply means Greece cannot survive without significant debt relief and restructuring, combined with an overhaul of the ways its government collects revenue and expends. In essence, Greece has 2 major problems: it has too much debt and it cannot grow. I am afraid more and more of EU will get contaminated.

Trouble in Greece: A Greek flag at the Akropolis in Athens. Millions of Greeks participated in a strike to oppose new heavy austerity measures. — EPA
 

The Greek illusion

Greece should not have been into the euro in the first place. It failed to join in 1999 because it did not meet fiscal criteria. When it did so in 2001, it was through phony budget numbers. As Twitter R. Cohen wrote: “Europe's bold monetary union required an Athenian imprimatur to be fully European. So everyone turned a blind eye.” But Greece has had an awful history. The 1912-13 war wrested northern Greece from Ottoman control. Then came the massive exchange of 1923 where 400,000 Muslims were forced from Greece to Turkey and 1.2 million Greek Orthodox Christians, from Turkey to Greece.

A military dictatorship followed in the 1930s; brutal German occupation in 1941-44; and a civil war in late 1940s. There was the rightist dictatorship of 1967-74, not to mention the on-going conflict with Turkey over Cyprus. In “Twice a Stranger”, B. Clark wrote of Greece as a society “where blood ties are far more important than loyalty to the state or to business partners.”

It would appear EU membership provided some balm to Greek wounds. It detoxifies history. So Greece took to the EU as a passport to live on the never-never. The bottom line: a monetary union among divergent economies without fiscal or political union support has no convincing historical precedent. For a while, the easy-money, easy-lifestyle allowed everyone to overlook peripheraleconomies like Greece from becoming uncompetitive with the euro (with no drachma to devalue) and not showing any signs of “converging” (closing the gulf between strong and weak nations within EU), but amassing unsustainable deficits and debt. Greece remains a nation suspicious of outsiders and a place where state structures command scant loyalty.

This does not abode well. We now see a Greece resentful of deep spending cuts, and of the sale of state assets meted out by technocrats from outside. They feel the poor and unemployed are paying for the errors of politicians, and a globalised system that punishes those left behind. Strikes and violence are a measure of a EU that now leaves most Greeks unmoved by the achievements of European integration.

Greece is insolvent

It is true a sovereign state, unlike a firm, has the power to tax. In theory, it can tax itself out of trouble. But there is a limit on how far it can tax before it becomes politically and socially unsustainable. Already, Greece has a debt/GDP ratio of 143% in 2010, rising to 150% this year. It is too high to convince creditors to continue lending.

In practice, the market expects Greece to reduce its debt ratio considerably before it can borrow again. This means it has to create a primary budget surplus (revenue less non-interest expenditure) in excess of 8% of GDP to be credit worthy again. Among advanced nations, none (except oil-rich Norway) has managed to attain a durable primary surplus exceeding 6% of GDP. Greece is insolvent.

This is a dire situation. Government bonds serve as a reference asset by setting the “riskless” rate of interest. So any doubts about its value can cause turmoil. Indeed, solvency of the Greek financial system is at risk. So are other European financial institutions. Equally vital is contagion with its sights set firmly on other debt-distressed nations notably Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy.

But it doesn't stop there. Top Europeans have warned contagion to EU members could spark off a crisis bigger than the Lehman Brothers collapse in Sept 2008. So, it is not difficult to understand the hard line taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) aimed primarily to protect European banks which need time to strengthen their capital base. For obvious reasons, it has rejected any sort of restructuring of debt raising the spectre of a chain reaction, and threatening to punish any restructuring (re-negotiation of the terms of maturing debt) by cutting banks' access to liquidity.

Moreover, credit rating agencies would deem any such action as a default (i.e. non-payment of due debt). With Greece insolvent, the EU has taken the narrow road of beefing up the financing for Greece (which can't refinance itself in the market), while using moral suasion to persuade private creditors to roll-over their bonds. It is buying breathing space.



More denial doesn't work just prolongs the agony. What's happening to Greece is distressful. Over the past 12 months: the number of unemployed rose by close to 40%; unemployment is above 16% among youths, it's a devastating 42%. IMF estimates showed its GDP contracted by 2% in 2009 and 4.5% in 2010 and will shrink by 3-4% this year.

Despite severe fiscal austerity, its budget deficit will improve only slowly: from -15.4% of GDP in 2009 to -9% in 2010 and -7% this year (and estimated at -6.2% in 2012). That's a long way to surplus! Greece has become so uncompetitive its current balance of payments deficit was -11% of GDP in 2009, -10% in 2010 and optimistically estimated at -8.2% this year (and at -7.2% in 2012). Truly, Greece is in “intensive-care” a solvency crisis, not just caught in a short-term cash crunch (yes, it also does not have cash to meet its next debt payment before July 15).

Even at today's low interest rates, Greece's government interest payments alone amounted to 6.7% of GDP, against 4.8% for Italy and considerably higher than all other major European nations and the United States (2.9%). Even Portugal's ratio is lower at 4.2%.

Political solution: slash and burn won't work

What Greece needs is deep economic reforms or fiscal transfers from the EU which help address deepening market concerns about sustainability of its huge debts. Without these, the crisis will simply be deferred.

The message is clear: Greece's debt load at Eureo 350 billion or 150% of its expected economic output this year, is simply too large for the EU troika's (plus ECB and IMF) strategy to succeed. Athens had accepted a package of Euro 110 billion of EU/IMF loans in May 2010. But it now needs a 2nd bailout of a similar size to meet financial obligations until end 2014 when it hopes to move seamlessly into the new ESM (European Stability Mechanism) bailout fund (which takes effect in 2013) to prop up fiscal miscreants.

Latest draw-down involves release of a vital Euro 12 billion very soon but carries a proviso that parliament passes on June 29 (which it did with a slim majority) Euro 28.6 billion in spending cuts and tax increases as well as Euro 50 billion from privatisation of state assets, in addition to continuing existing austerity policies.

That's not all. The new plan calls for private creditor's participation on a voluntary basis (meeting ECB's insistence to avoid even a hint of default) or “Vienna Plus”, a reference to the 2009 Vienna initiative where banks agreed to maintain their exposure to Eastern Europe.

For Greece, the brutal austerity plans call for enormous sacrifices; indeed, no end to their agonies. Today, the situation at Syntagma Square and in front of parliament is getting more strained, angry and confused, surrounded by riot police and clouds of teargas. The people are becoming frustrated at being always at the receiving end.

On the German side, however, voters are aghast at the prospect of a 2nd bail-out, which they regard as pouring good money after bad. Germans consider the Greek government as corrupt; its tax system operates on voluntarism; state railroad's payroll is 4 times larger than its ticket sales; many workers retire with full state pension at age 45; etc.

Be that as it may, the IMF in particular needs to learn from lessons of the Asian currency crisis, where it has since acknowledged its prescriptions at the time made matters worse in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, in the name of unleashing market forces to force adjustment and ignoring the adverse social and political impact of their policies.

I see them repeating the same mistakes again in Greece, paying too little heed to human suffering and adverse social impact to protect private sector creditors and pushing the end-game at breakneck pace. Germany's insistence to get private creditors share in the burden is a good soft step forward. Even so, the IMF seems too harsh.

Few options left

The fact remains Greece was outstandingly egregious in its fiscal profligacy and its lack of prudent economic governance. But Greece was not the only European economy that was living beyond its means and being pumped withill-conceived loans mainly from German and French banks. Greece is today insolvent. The EU's solution addresses only immediate funding needs, without offering a credible long-term resolution. It's just a stopgap. Frankly, Greece'spolicy options are limited: either a default, partial haircut (creditors taking losses on their investments), or a guarantee on Greek debt. Bear in mind Germany remains the biggest beneficiary of the euro-zone experiment. In 2010,

Germany recorded a US$185bil balance of payments surplus or 5.6% of GDP. No doubt, the EU has since pledged to stabilise the euro-zone economy, vowing to starve off a Greek default, and the ECB has categorically ruled out debt restructuring. That leaves Greece with only deflation, a lot of it.

As I see it, this will not work. First, in a democratic Greece, people are clearly not in the mood for deeper spending cuts and more austerity. Policies can be adopted but they can fail. Second, deflation had already made Greece's debt problem worse the debt is too large and the economy won't grow with continuing deflation. It can't just deflate its way to solvency.

The better option left is debt guarantee. Issuing guarantees (preferably partially backed by Greek assets) could help persuade creditors to exchange debt for new debt with longer maturities, effectively giving Athens more time to repay. As of now, only 27% of Greek debt is held by banks, 30% by ECB/EU/IMF, and 43% by other privates. Banks are already quietly resisting voluntary rolling-over unless offered incentives. EU has preferred to use moral suasion.

EU has also resisted haircuts. Mr Axel Weber, former Bundesbank governor, has since weighed in: “At some point you've got to cut your losses and restart the system,” drawing parallels between guarantee for Greek debt and steps taken by Germany and others during the financial crisis to backstop troubled banks.

The Greek problem “is a deep-rooted fiscal and structural problem that probably needs more than a 30-year time horizon to solve. The measures Europe need to adopt are much more profound than just short-term liquidity funds.” That, of course, raises the issue of “moral hazard”. EU has since pledged to stabilise the euro-zone, and starve off a Greek default in exchange for continuing Greek deflation and voluntary creditors' roll-over. Getting banks to share in the burden remains problematic. But, a narrow policy option is taken. It's another muddle-through created in response to politics. It offers no long-term way for Greece to resume growth.

I am told the political mood in Greece improves automatically in July and August as the urbans head en masse for family villages in the islands and mountains. Surely, for a little while, human woes will be eased by exposure to the beauty of the Agean.

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard-educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting the public interest. Feedback is most welcome at starbizweek@thestar.com.my

U.S. Debt Default Might Have ‘Catastrophic’ !

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Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC Chief Executive Officer Mohamed El-Erian said a short-term default by the U.S. on its debt might have “catastrophic” legal consequences.


“We would be in the land of the unpredictable” if lawmakers fail to reach an agreement to raise the $14.3 trillion debt ceiling and the U.S. misses a payment “simply because of the technical linkages,” El-Erian said in an interview on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS” program, scheduled to air today.

U.S. lawmakers are seeking a path to increasing the debt limit and to cutting at least $1 trillion from the long-term deficit before an Aug. 2 deadline. President Barack Obama plans to hold separate meetings at the White House June 27 with Senate leaders Nevada Democrat Harry Reid and Kentucky Republican Mitch McConnell in an effort to break an impasse that scuttled a seven-week negotiating effort led by Vice President Joe Biden.

“My advice is please try and get together and solve this issue in the context of a medium-term reform package,” El-Erian said.

“If you can’t do that and you’re going to kick the can down the road, kick the can rather than face something that could be catastrophic in terms of legal contracts being triggered.”



Pimco, the world’s biggest manager of bond funds, sees more value in non-U.S. government bonds than U.S. Treasuries as the Federal Reserve prepares to end its $600 billion bond-repurchase program this month, El-Erian said. Pimco, of Newport Beach, California, is a unit of the Munich-based insurer Allianz SE. (ALV)
 
“A basic rule as an investor is don’t buy something unless you know who else is going to be buying,” he said. “So when we look at Treasuries, we see the big buyer stepping away from the market, for certain. And we ask the question, who else is going to be buying at these levels, and we can’t identify another buyer of the size of the Fed.”

El-Erian said the U.S. fiscal problems are dwarfed by those of Greece, whose debt reached 143 percent of gross domestic product last year.

“It is inevitable that Greece would have to restructure its debt,” he said. “Greece has two problems: it has too much debt and it cannot grow. And until these problems are solved, more and more of Europe is going to become contaminated.”

Europe has been treating Greece “not as a solvency issue, but as a liquidity problem,” El-Erian said. “We had a massive bailout a year ago in Greece, massive. A year later, every single indicator in Greece is worse off.”

-- With assistance from Heidi Przybyla, Julianna Goldman, Cheyenne Hopkins and Ian Katz in Washington. Editors: Ann Hughey, Christian Thompson.

To Repay or Not to Repay Debts?

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Jean Pisani-Ferry

BRUSSELS – For months now, a fight over sovereign-debt restructuring has been raging between those who insist that Greece must continue to honor its signature and those for whom the country’s debt should be partly canceled.

As is often the case in Europe, the crossfire of contradictory official and non-official statements has been throwing markets into turmoil. Confusion abounds; clarity is needed.

The first question is whether Greece is still solvent. This is harder to judge than is the solvency of a firm, because a sovereign state possesses the power to tax. In theory, all that is needed in order to get out of debt is to increase taxes and cut spending.

But the power to tax is not limitless. A government determined to honor its debts at any cost often ends up imposing a tax burden that is disproportionate to the level of services that it supplies; at a certain point, this discrepancy becomes socially and politically unsustainable.

Even if the Greek government were to succeed shortly in stabilizing its debt ratio (soon to reach 150% of GDP), it would be at too high a level to convince creditors to continue lending. Greece will need to reduce its debt ratio considerably before it can return to the capital markets, which implies – even under an optimistic scenario – creating a primary surplus in excess of eight percentage points of GDP. Among advanced-country governments, none (except oil-rich Norway) has managed to achieve a durable primary budget surplus (revenue less non-interest expenditure) exceeding 6% of GDP.



This is too much for a democratic country, especially one where the tax burden is very unequally shared. Greece is, in fact, insolvent.

The second question is how serious a problem it is not to repay one’s debts.

One camp notes that, for decades, no advanced country has dared to do this, and that is why these countries still enjoy a positive reputation. If just one member of the eurozone embarked on the debt-default path, all the rest would immediately come under suspicion. In any case, according to this view, contracts simply must be respected, whatever the cost.

On the other side are those who call for the creditors who triggered the excessive debt to be punished for their imprudence. Lenders must suffer losses, so that they price sovereign risk more accurately in the future and make reckless governments pay higher interest rates.

Both lines of argument are valid, but the fact is that countries that have restructured their debt have not found themselves worse off as a result.

On the contrary, far from being banished from bond markets, they have generally bounced back quickly: investors like a sinner who returns to solvency better than a paragon of virtue on the verge of suffocation.

Twenty years ago, Poland negotiated a reduction in its debt and came off better than Hungary, which was keen to protect its reputation. Debt reduction is not fatal.

The third question is whether a Greek default would be a financial catastrophe – and when it should take place. Two channels are at work, one internal and one external.

First, government bonds are the reference asset for banks and insurers, because they are easily tradable and ensure liquidity. Obviously, any doubt about the value of such bonds could cause turmoil. The Greek banking system’s solvency and access to refinancing would be hit severely.

Externally, in turn, other European banks would be affected. But more importantly, other debt-distressed countries – at least Ireland, Portugal, and Spain – would be vulnerable to financial contagion.

So this is a dire situation. But it does not explain the European Central Bank’s attitude. The central bank has motives to be concerned. But instead of trying to find a way to cushion the possible impact of such a shock, the ECB is rejecting out of hand any sort of restructuring.

Indeed, it is raising the specter of a chain reaction by invoking the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and threatening to punish any restructuring by cutting banks’ access to liquidity.

But if Greece is not solvent, either the EU must assume its debts or the risk will hang over it like a sword of Damocles. By refusing a planned and orderly restructuring, the eurozone is exposing itself to the risk of a messy default.

Europe, however, is not obliged to choose between catastrophe and mutualization of debt. The best route – admittedly a narrow road – is initially to beef up the financing program for Greece, which cannot finance itself on the market, while at the same time ensuring through moral suasion that private creditors do not withdraw too easily.

This is what is being attempted at the moment. But this breathing space must be used for more than simply buying time.

It should be used, first, to allow other distressed countries to regain or consolidate their financial credibility, and, second, to pave the way for an orderly restructuring of Greek debt, which requires preparation. Gaining time makes sense only if it helps to solve the problem, rather than prolonging the suffering.

Jean Pisani-Ferry is Director of Bruegel, an international economics think tank, Professor of Economics at Université Paris-Dauphine, and a member of the French Prime Minister’s Council of Economic Analysis.

Debt-consolidation plans vital

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MAKING A POINT By JAGDEV SINGH SIDHU

IT'S easy to picture the worst when the news around us is not savoury at all.

The platter for such troubles will include the second-quarter slowdown induced by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Output around the world has been shaken by the ramifications of the supply shock from Japan.

Then there is the report card on the US Federal Reserve's second round of quantitative easing (QE2). For many, QE2 really did not help the foundation of the economy. Unemployment is still sticky and there is still weakness in the housing sector but the stock market and commodities boomed with cheap liquidity flooding the market.

Inflation jumped as raw material prices surged and that, in effect, robbed a lot of people of purchasing power.

Looking at Greece, one has to assume a default is a certainty and is just a question of time. In fact, the CEO of Pimco, the world's largest bond fund, expects that to happen and many, too, agree looking at the economic structure of Greece.

Despite the gloom, the prognosis for the global economy really has not changed much.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects the world economy to grow by 4.3% for 2011, which is 0.1% lower than previously estimated.

It has cut its growth forecast for the United States to 2.5% in 2011 from an earlier estimate of 2.8% in April.

IMF's Olivier Blanchard, who is its economic counsellor and the director of the research department, said predicting the economic direction for the US was too early but felt the slowdown of the US economy was more of a bump on the road than something worse.



“But assuming that oil prices are going to stay roughly stable, which is what the markets seem to predict at this point, we think that spending by consumers and firms should remain steady in what is, however, very clearly a very weak recovery. This has been a longstanding forecast of ours. The recovery in the US is a very weak one,” said Blanchard last week.

The outlook for Japan saw the biggest change as the earthquake and tsunami are expected to see that economy contracting by 0.7% this year from an earlier forecast of a 1.4% growth made in April.

The IMF has stuck to its projections for the two most populous countries, estimating growth for China and India to register 9.6% and 8.2% respectively this year. Those estimates were unchanged from April.

With troubles in Greece hogging international financial news and people wondering about the repercussions of a default by Greece on financial institutions in Europe and the US, the IMF said the risk of contagion was real and could derail European recovery and even that of the world but thought advanced economies, in which Europe features prominently, was forecast to grow at 2.2% for 2011, down 0.2 percentage points from earlier thought.

Its forecast for emerging and developing economies is 6.6% for 2011, which is up 0.1 percentage points since April.
While forecasts are relatively flat, the IMF did say risks were visible and highlighted the debt issue not only in Europe to be one of the hazard points for the global economy.

It feels debt-consolidation plans, even in the US, needs to be in place for the medium term to avoid higher borrowing costs and slower economic growth in the future.

In Asia, asset and price inflation are seen as the key risks and it feels countries with large current account surpluses should allow their currencies to appreciate.

“All countries must choose the right combination of instruments at their disposal fiscal, monetary, macro prudential to slow their economies in time and avoid costly boom-bust cycles,” said Blanchard.

Whether the bad news translates to most people's economic nightmare is something most businesses and investors are keeping an eye out for. It would appear that, for now at least, prospects and risks are balanced.

Deputy news editor Jagdev Singh Sidhu has filled nearly every large container at home with water to prepare for a dry couple of days but water is still flowing strongly from the main pipe.