A military pivot to Asia
By TANG SIEW MUN
‘Pivoting to Asia’ is fast becoming the centrepiece of US strategic and diplomatic objectives.
IF there were doubts about America’s “return” to Asia, all were
dissipated with the release of the new strategic guidance report by the
Pentagon on Jan 5.
Washington’s grand objective can be gleaned
from the title of the report, “Sustaining US Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defence”.
While the report affirms US
interests worldwide and renews its pledge to uphold its commitments to
its allies and friends, it unambiguously stresses the importance of
Asia. It states that the US “will of necessity rebalance towards the
Asia-Pacific region”.
The report follows through the grand
strategic vision enunciated by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in an
article published in
Foreign Policy where she declared that “the
future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and
the United States will be right at the centre of the action”.
“Pivoting to Asia” is fast becoming the centrepiece of US strategic and diplomatic objectives.
Before
“pivoting” became the cornerstone of the US-Asia policy, the region was
abuzz with the US “return” to Asia. China, understandably, was
especially agitated.
Indeed, there are segments in China who view
the US “return” to Asia with a sense of foreboding, as US initiatives
are seen as stratagems to contain China’s growing influence and power in
the region.
If hitherto there were concerns about the US return
to Asia, then Washington’s “pivot movement” to Asia will certainly
generate more discussion and potentially countervailing measures.
To
be sure, “pivoting” is different from “returning”. In general, a US
return would be marked by its heightened diplomatic engagement,
especially with its newfound interest and support for multilateral
initiatives such as the
East Asia Summit.
A US “return” to Asia
would be largely viewed by South-East Asia as a positive development,
especially in an uncertain strategic environment punctuated by China’s
expanding economic and military power.
In this regard, the US is
seen as a reliable and indispensable power to balance and, if necessary,
to check Chinese aggressive designs.
However, pivoting in the context of the Pentagon report may see an increased
US military presence in the region.
South-East
Asia is no stranger to the US military. Up until November 1991 when the
Clark Air Base was returned to the Philippines, the US had maintained a
large military footprint in the region.
The US has close
relations with its treaty partners Thailand and the Philippines. In
November 1990, the US negotiated an arrangement with Singapore that gave
it access to and use of facilities in the city state.
Singapore
is also home to the US Navy’s Logistics Group Western Pacific that
provides logistics support for the
US Seventh Fleet.
For many
decades, the US had consistently maintained a high strategic profile
through bilateral and multilateral military exercises and other
military-to-military cooperation.
The hubs-and-spokes system of
bilateral security treaties, which includes South Korea, Japan and
Australia, has long been regarded as the backbone of the region’s
security.
The strategic presence of the US in, and its engagement
with, the region is often quoted as one of the primary reasons for
South-East Asia’s stability and growth.
The argument goes that
the US provided the security umbrella which allowed
South-East Asian
states to limit their defence outlays.
This argument was
certainly valid during the
Cold War era when the Asean states were
undoubtedly pro-American and cooperated to varying degrees with the US.
In
fact, when the US Air Force pulled out of the Clark Air Base, there was
a sense of trepidation and the perception that the US was withdrawing
from the region.
There was genuine fear about a power vacuum
which would “invite” other major powers to supplant the US’ dominant
role in regional security.
Fortunately, these fears were
unfounded as the expected jostling for primacy in Asia and the feared US
retreat did not materialise.
While the US’ diplomatic and
political “return” to the region is applauded and welcomed, reception
for its “pivot to Asia” may be less enthusiastic.
There are
several reasons for such pessimism. Granted that the pivot strategy will
be multifaceted and not uni-dimensionally focusing on military power.
However, it is the latter component of the pivot strategy that may prove to be most controversial.
To
the extent that pivoting entails an enlarged and more visible military
footprint, it will be destabilising and anathema to regional security.
An
increased US military profile will generate what academics understand
as a “security dilemma” and make China feel uncomfortable, to put it
mildly.
A case in point is the recent announcement of the
deployment up to 2,500 US Marines on a “rotational” basis in Darwin,
Australia.
Washington and Canberra were quick to emphasise the
transient nature of the deployment, but whichever way one attempts to
slice and dice “Darwin”, in the eyes of the Chinese and the rest of
South-East Asia, this move puts hundreds of well-trained and highly
mobile US military personnel at the edge of the region.
It is a potential “beach head” for the US to organise and launch military expeditions into South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean.
We can also expect to see more of the Stars and Stripes in the region.
Last
month, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert wrote in the
US Naval Institute’s Proceedings that the US is contemplating deploying
littoral combat ships in Singapore and “other places” in South-East
Asia.
We must ask ourselves whether there is an imminent threat in the region that necessitates increased fire power from the US.
There
is a point beyond which an increased military presence provides a
negative marginal return. More is not always necessarily better.
There
may be quarters in South-East Asia that embrace a larger US military
role and profile. Notable among these are the “hedgers” who no doubt see
the US as the ultimate “insurance policy” to guard against strategic
uncertainty.
When it is diplomatically untenable and militarily
impractical to balance against China’s expanding military might, then
the growing presence of the US is reassuring, to say the least.
It cannot be denied that the
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing muscle is being closely monitored and analysed.
While there is no unified response to this phenomenon, it is accepted that South-East Asia cannot match the PLA gun for gun.
A
military response is destructive and ultimately futile. The preferred
modality is to embed China in a web of regional and multilateral
cooperation mechanisms.
The Asean China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) and the Asean Plus Three (APT) are but two examples.
South-East
Asia should stay the course and continue its ongoing successful
engagement of China. However, the military component of “pivoting” may
serve to amplify the strategic divide and suspicions between China and
South-East Asia.
The implications of “pivoting” are multiple. For a start, the US will seek a larger voice and role in the region.
Secretary
Clinton spoke for many Americans when she asserted that Asia is the
future and correspondingly the US must be in Asia.
The substantive question that needs to be asked is, “When the US leads, should Asia fall in line and accept US leadership?”
It
would be unrealistic for Washington to assume that Asia will do this.
Acceptance of US leadership is not universal, nor is it automatic.
Support
for the US in Indonesia, South-East Asia’s largest country, is
slipping. The Pew Global Attitudes Survey showed it has declined from
56% in 2009 to 49% in 2010.
Asia does not dance to the tune of Washington, nor does it march to the beat of the Chinese.
While
Washington sees its future in Asia, it needs to be mindful that the
success of its “pivot” strategy is contingent on the concurrence and
support of Asia.
The operative words are cooperation and collaboration.
The
region’s strategic uncertainty – read as fear of China – cannot be
resolved by the placement of more US troops in the region or through
military grandstanding.
It is not about being pro-US or
anti-China but how to build a stable, secure and prosperous future. The
US pivot to Asia should be welcomed to the extent that it contributes
constructively to a better and brighter future for Asia.
>
The writer is Director (Foreign Policy and Security Studies) at the
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia. The
views are his own.
Obama's New Defense Strategy: Poke a Stick In China's Eye And See What Happens
This
new "Defense Strategy" of President Obama's is a deliberate provocation of the Chinese, as was his trip to Asia last
month when he made his none too cute "We're
Back" declaration.
Last Month in Australia Obama was quoted as saying, “Let there be no doubt: in the
Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.”
If there was doubt in anyone's mind in Beijing, about American intentions
Obama dispelled that doubt and any room for reasoned diplomacy by elaborating that this is a
“deliberate and strategic decision” America is “here to stay”. What an affront to the Chinese! We were hoping the State Department would let this
new offensive go quietly away. Unfortunately, that is not to be. Obama's "Strategy" is a
dangerous road to take. If it is intended to assist him in his re election efforts it will seriously
backfire. Unfortunately, the consequence won't be just Obama's and the
Democrat Party. The outcome of this foreign policy fiasco will fall squarely on the shoulders of America and it's allies. This new policy is literal insanity. It would appear Obama is playing right into the hands of Hu
Jintao and the Chinese military leaders who are just chomping at the bit for a fight. An Article in the Economist in
a much more nuanced and cautious fashion discusses the concerns many
other's have about the manner in which Obama is flexing his muscles and
apparently bullying for a fight with the Chinese.
 |
China hasn't issued a stamp with this ferocious a dragon
since 1878 (Photo Xinhua) |
This
is the year of the dragon and they must be deft dumb and blind over in
foggy bottom to have missed the significance the Chinese attribute to
this auspicious event. The dragon was a symbol of China's Imperial
Power and today it is a not too subtle symbol of China's Military,
Political and Economic power. That China chose to reissue such a ferocious stamp this year is no coincidence.
We have
to ask ourselves why has Obama picked this time to insult and bully a
world power that is vastly superior to our own, certainly in it's own
backyard. Does anyone think the Chinese are going to stand idly by as
Obama in his arrogance, asserts his "right" to "ensure China's peaceful rise to power".
The implied threat in that statement from Obama and the Clinton State
Department is palpable. The US, in the person of Obama, is saying,
"We're going to come into China's sphere of influence
and arbitrate and adjudicate any and all issues we decide have a
national security interest to us." Certainly, the United States should
not cede it's position as a world power and it's interests but to do so
in such an ignorant and arrogant fashion is inexcusable.
A bizarre thought
occurs to us that given Obama's own love of Socialism and Marxism maybe
his provocation of China is intended to give Hu and General Lin Yuan, (A possible successor to Hu) an excuse and license to go to war with America.
Posted by
FarmerRicky
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