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Showing posts with label US dollar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US dollar. Show all posts

Saturday, October 15, 2011

Changing the international monetary system

2007 $1 Washington coin reverse.


THINK ASIAN By ANDREW SHENG

ON Oct 5, 2011, the Triffin International Conference celebrated the 100th year of birth of Robert Triffin, a Belgian economist who was trained in Harvard, worked in the US Fed, taught in Yale and then returned to Europe to help work on European monetary integration.

He was of course famous for the Triffin Dilemma, defined as the inconsistency between the domestic needs of the reserve currency country and the external needs of the world that uses the reserve currency. Put in another way, Triffin identified that the reserve currency country would have to run a current account deficit in order to provide the world with greater liquidity.

Over the long term, running cumulative current account deficits becomes a large debt overhang that is called the Global Imbalance.

Triffin wrote about the Dilemma in the late 1960s, when the United States was struggling whether to maintain its peg to gold, which it abandoned in 1971. This removed the anchor of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which had been in existence since 1947.

The succeeding Bretton Woods II, or non-system as some critics call it, has become a system of flexible exchange rates, plagued by financial crises every decade in the 1980s (Latin America), 1990s (Mexico and East Asia), 2007-9 (US subprime) and today, the European debt crisis.

Today, there is sufficient awareness that the shift from a unipolar world to a multipolar global financial system carries with it great risks and unknowns. The unipolar world of dominance by the US dollar had a lot of advantages, as long as the US remained the unchallenged hegemonic power. The US dollar became not only the standard unit of account for global trade, but also the deepest and most liquid market and an important store of value.

The price of oil, gold and other important commodities are all measured in US dollars. The US Treasuries market is the most liquid and efficient clearing system, which is one fundamental reason why the dollar remains superior to the euro, which does not have a single eurobond market, being divided into different national (German, French, etc) bond markets.



According to the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) April 2010 survey data, the US dollar today still accounts for 85% of global foreign exchange trading, compared with 39% for the euro, 19% for yen and 13% for sterling (because FX transactions are paired, total turnover sums up to 200%). By contrast, the Hong Kong dollar accounts for only 2.4% and the yuan 0.9% of turnover.

Because of its dominance in international trade and payments, the US dollar still accounts for nearly two thirds of total foreign exchange reserves. China alone reputedly holds roughly US$2 trillion in US dollar assets in the foreign exchange reserves and holdings by Chinese banks and state-owned enterprises.

In 2009, People's Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan called for the use of the SDRs (International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights) as a possible global reserve currency. The logic for a globally issued reserve currency as opposed to a nationally issued reserve currency is impeccable. Nationally issued reserve currencies are subject to the Triffin Dilemma, because countries, however strong, will sooner or later go into deficit.

In other words, the whole global financial system is stable when the national reserve currency country is strong, but it will go into crisis, when the national reserve currency country goes into crisis. This is the current state of affairs.

The four reserve currency countries (US, euro area, Britain and Japan) accounting for just under 60% of world GDP are all in deep trouble. The US is running a current account deficit in excess of 3% of GDP and a fiscal deficit over 9% of GDP in 2011. At the end of 2010, the US had a gross foreign liability of US$22.8 trillion or 157% of GDP. Thank goodness that most of the debt is in US dollars, so that it can devalue its way out of debt.

The euro area as a whole has a smaller current account deficit of 0.5% of GDP, but if you look deeper, there are deep imbalances within the eurozone. Germany, the Netherlands and a few are in surplus, whereas the smaller countries like Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain all have net foreign liabilities exceeding 50% of GDP, an indicator of crisis using the Asian crisis experience as rule of thumb.

Britain has a fiscal deficit of 8.8% of GDP and gross debt of 81% of GDP. Its one advantage relative to the Euro is that it can devalue its way out of debt.

Japan, on the other hand, has a net foreign surplus of 50% of GDP, being a major net lender to the rest of world, since it runs a current account surplus of 2.3% of GDP. Its vulnerability is, however, its large domestic gross debt of 220% of GDP, growing larger every year with fiscal current account deficit of 8.3% of GDP in 2011. This means that the domestic debt is vulnerable to bubble implosion, because if interest rate rises, the debt becomes unsustainable.

In sum, the reserve currency countries are in a double trap. They have to run loose monetary policy to keep interest rates low, so that their fiscal debt will not run out of control. But their central banks also know that exceptionally low interest rates are distorting not only global financial markets, they also have very distortive impact on their domestic resource allocation.

This is the liquidity debt trap that Japan got into in 1990 when its asset market bubble burst following the sharp rise in the yen exchange rate. Japanese GDP growth never fully recovered after that. Reserve country status has not been a privilege, but a curse.

The emerging markets are struggling because the present international monetary system has become unstable and unsustainable. How should this essentially unipolar system be reformed to a multi-polar system where yuan plays a role will be the subject of the next column.

l Tan Sri Andrew Sheng is president of the Fung Global Institute.

Saturday, September 24, 2011

Currency War & Exchange Rates Tension!

IMF Data Dissemination Systems participants: I...Image via Wikipedia



Tension over exchange rates

WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

Amid heightened fears over eurozone sovereign debt risks and increasing concerns about the health of the United States and eurozone economies, worried investors have flocked to the safety of haven currencies, especially the Swiss franc, and gold.

While investors and speculators have since moved aggressively to buy gold, the switch from being large sellers to buying by a number of emerging nation's central banks (Mexico, Russia, South Korea and Thailand) has helped propel the price of gold more than 25% higher this year, hitting a record US$1,920 a troy ounce earlier this month. At a time of high uncertainty in the face of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) latest gloomy forecast on global growth, few central banks relish the prospect of a flood of international cash pushing their currencies higher.

Massive over-valuation of their currencies poses an acute threat to their economic well-being, and carries the risk of deflation.

The Swiss franc

Switzerland's national currency, the CHF, should be used to speculative attacks by now. So much so in the 1970s, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) was forced to impose negative interest rates on foreign investors (who have to pay banks to accept their CHF deposits).

And, it has been true in recent years, with the CHF rising by 43% against the euro since the start of 2010 until mid-August this year. There does not seem to be an alternative to the CHF as a safe haven at the moment.

With what's going on in the United States, eurozone and Japan, investors have lost faith in the world's two other haven currencies: US dollar (USD) and the yen.

This reflects the Federal Reserves' ultra-loose policy stance and the political fiscal impasse in the United States which have scared away investments from the dollar. The prospect that Tokyo might once again intervene to limit the yen's strength has deterred speculators from betting on further gains from it. To be fair, the CHF has also benefitted from recent signs that the Swiss economy, thanks in large part to its close ties to a resurgent Germany, is thriving.

But enough is enough. SNB made a surprising announcement on Sept 6 that it would buy foreign currencies in “unlimited quantities” to combat a huge over-valuation of the CHF, and keep the franc-euro exchange rate above 1.20 with the “utmost determination.”

On Aug 9, the CHF reached a new record, touching near parity against the euro from 1.25 at the start of the year, while the USD sank to almost CHF 0.70 (from 0.93). The impact so far has been positive: the euro rose 8% on that day and the 1.20 franc level had since stabilised. It was a gamble.

Of course, SNB had intervened before in 2009 and 2010, but in a limited way at a time when the euro was far stronger. But this time, with the nation's economy buckling under the currency's massive over-valuation, the risks of doing nothing were far greater. In July last year, following a chequered history of frustrated attempts, SNB vowed it would not intervene again. By then, the central bank was already awash with foreign currency reserves. Worse, the CHF value of these reserves plunged as the currency strengthened. In 2010, SNB recorded a loss of CHF20 billion, and a further CHF10 billion in 1H'11. As a result, SNB came under severe political pressure for not paying the expected dividend. But exporters also demanded further intervention to stop the continuing appreciation.

This time, SNB is up against a stubborn euro-debt crisis which just won't go away. True, recent efforts have been credible. Indeed, the 1.20 francs looks defensible, even though the CHF remains over-valued. Fair value appears to be closer to 1.30-1.40. But inflation is low; still, the risk of asset-price bubbles remains. What's worrisome is SNB acted alone. For the European Central Bank (ECB), the danger lies in SNB's eventual purchases of higher quality German and French eurozone government bonds with the intervention receipts, countering the ECB's own intervention in the bond market to help weaker members of Europe's monetary union, including Italy and Spain.



This causes the spread between the yields of these bonds to widen, and pile on further pressure on peripheral economies. Furthermore, unlimited Swiss buying of euro would push up its value, adding to deflationary pressures in the region.

The devil's trade-off

As I see it, the Swiss really has no other options. SNB has been attempting to drive down the CHF by intervening in the money markets but with little lasting effect. “The current massive over-valuation of the CHF poses an acute threat to the Swiss economy,” where exports accounted for 35% of its gross domestic product. The new policy would help exports and help job security. As of now, there is no support from Europe to drive the euro higher.

SNB is caught in the “devil's trade-off,” having to choose risking its balance sheet rather than risk “mounting unemployment, deflation and economic damage.” The move is bound to cause distortions and tension over exchange rates globally.

New haven: the Nokkie'

SNB's new policy stance has sent ripples through currency markets. In Europe, it drove the Norwegian krone (Nokkie) to an eight-year high against the euro as investors sought out alternative safe havens. Since money funds must have a minimum exposure in Europe and, with most European currencies discredited and quality bonds yielding next to nothing, the Nokkie became a principal beneficiary. It offers 3% return for three-month money-market holdings.

Elsewhere, the Swedish krona also gained ground, rising to its strongest level against the euro since June after its central bank left its key interest rates unchanged, while signalling that the rate will only creep up. What's worrisome is that if there is continuing upward pressure on the Nokkie or the krona, their central banks would act, if needed with taxes and exchange controls. With interest rates at or near zero and fiscal policy exhausted or ruled out politically in the most advanced nations, currencies remain one of the only policy tools left.

At a time of high uncertainty, investors are looking for havens. Apart from gold and some real assets, few countries would welcome fresh inflows which can stir to over-value currencies. Like it or not, speculative capital will still find China and Indonesia particularly attractive.

Yen resists the pressure 

SNB's placement of a “cap” to weaken the CHF has encouraged risk-adverse investors who sought comfort in the franc to turn to the yen instead. So far, the yen has stayed below its record high reached in mid-August. But it remains well above the exporters' comfort level.

Indeed, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has signalled its readiness to ease policy to help as global growth falters. But so far, the authorities are happy just monitoring and indications are they will resist pressure to be as bold as the Swiss, for three main reasons: (i) unlike to CHF, the yen is not deemed to be particularly strong at this time it's roughly in line with its 30-year average; (ii) unlike SNB, Japan is expected to respect the G-7's commitment to market determined exchange rates; and (iii) Japan's economy is five times the size of Switzerland and the yen trading volume makes defending a pre-set rate in the global markets well-nigh impractical.

Still, they have done so on three occasions over the past 12 months: a record 4.51 trillion yen sell-off on Aug 9 (surpassing the previous daily record of 2.13 trillion yen from Sept 2010).

The operation briefly pushed the USD to 80.25 yen (from 77.1 yen) but the effects quickly waned and the dollar fell back to a record low of 75.9 yen on Aug 19. But, I gather the Finance Ministry needs to meet three conditions for intervention: (a) the yen/USD rate has to be volatile; (b) a simultaneous easing by BoJ; and (c) intervention restricted to one day only.

Given these constraints, it is no wonder MOF has failed to arrest the yen's underlying trend. In the end, I think the Japanese has learnt to live with it unlike the Swiss who has the motivation and means to resist a strong currency.

Reprieve for the yuan 

I sense one of the first casualties of the failing global economic expansion is renewed pressure to further appreciate the yuan. For China, August was a good month to adjust strong exports, high inflation and intense international pressure. As a result, the yuan appreciated against the USD by more than 11%, up from an average of about 5% in the first seven months of the year. However, the surge had begun to fade in the first half of September.

But with the United States and eurozone economic outlook teetering in gloom, China's latest manufacturing performance had also weakened, reflecting falling overseas demand.

This makes imposing additional currency pressure on exporters a no-go. Meanwhile, inflation has stabilised. Crude oil and imported food prices have declined, reducing inflationary pressure and the incentive to further appreciate the yuan. Looks like September provided a period of some relief. But, make no mistake, the pressure is still there. The fading global recovery may have papered over the cracks. Pressure won't grind to a halt.

Central banks instinctively try to ward-off massive capital flows appreciating their currencies. There are similarities between what's happening today, highlighted by the recent defensive move by SNB, and the tension over exchange rates at last year-end. It's an exercise in pushing the problem next door.

This can be viewed as a consequence of recent Japanese action (Tokyo's repeated intervention to sell yen). It threatens to start a chain of responses where every central bank tries to weaken its currency in the face of poor global economic prospects and growing uncertainty. So far, the tension has not risen to anything like last year's level. But with rising political pressure provoking resistance to currency appreciation, the potential for a fresh outbreak remains real. The Brazilian Finance Minister just repeated his warning last year that continuing loose US monetary policies could stoke a currency war.

Growing stress

With the euro under growing stress from sovereign debt problems, the market's focus is turning back to Japan (prompting a new plan to deal with a strong yen), to non-eurozone nations (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and possibly the United Kingdom) and on to Asia (already the ringgit, rupiah, baht and won are coming under pressure on concerns over uncertainty and capital flight). Similarly, Brazil's recent actions to limit currency appreciation highlights the dilemma faced by fast growing economies (Turkey, Chile and Russia) since allowing currency appreciation limits domestic overheating but also undermines competitiveness.

This low level currency war between emerging and advanced economies had further unsettled financial markets.

Given the weak economic outlook, most governments would prefer to see their currencies weaken to help exports. The risk, as in the 1930s, is not just “beggar-thy-neighbour” devaluations but resort to a wide range of trade barriers as well. Globally co-ordinated policies under G-20 are preferred. But that's easier said than done.

So, it is timely for the IMF's September “World Economic Outlook” to warn of “severe repercussions” to the global economy as the United States and eurozone could face recession and a “lost decade” of growth (a replay of Japan in the 90s) unless nations revamped economic policies. For the United States, this means less reliance on debt and putting its fiscal house in order.

For the eurozone, firm resolution of the debt crisis, including strengthening its banking system. For China, increased reliance on domestic demand. And, for Brazil, cooling an over-heating economy. This weekend, the G-20 is expected to take-up global efforts to rebalance the world overwhelmed by heightened risks to growth and the deepening debt crisis. Focus is expected on the role of exchange rates in rebalancing growth, piling more pressure on China's yuan.

Frankly, IMF meetings and G-20 gatherings don't have a track record of getting things done. I don't expect anything different this time. The outlook just doesn't look good.

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.

Thursday, June 9, 2011

US dollar died, debt default is unimaginable, "playing with fire", creditors say


The Day the Dollar Died 



UD debt default is unimaginable  The National Debt Clock next to an IRS office near Times Square, May 16, 2011. REUTERS/Chip EastBy Emily Kaiser  SINGAPORE, Agencies

SINGAPORE - Allowing a brief US debt default to force government spending cuts is a "horrible idea" that could destabilize the world economy and sour already tense relations with big creditors, government officials and investors said on Wednesday.

A growing number of US Republican lawmakers think a technical debt default might be a price worth paying if it gets the White House to accept deep spending cuts. This idea, once confined to the party's fringe, is seeping into the mainstream, Reuters reported on Tuesday.

"How can the US be allowed to default?" said an official at India's central bank. "We don't think this is a possibility because this could then create huge panic globally.

Indian officials say they have little choice but to buy US Treasury debt because it is still among the world's safest and most liquid investments. It held $39.8 billion in US Treasuries as of March, according to US data.

The US Congress has balked at increasing a statutory limit on government spending as lawmakers argue over how to curb a deficit which is projected to reach $1.4 trillion this fiscal year. The US Treasury Department has said it will run out of borrowing room by August 2.

If Washington cannot make interest payments on its debt, the Obama administration has warned of "catastrophic" consequences that could push the still-fragile economy back into recession.

"It has dire implications for the economy at a time when the macro data is softening," said Ben Westmore, a commodities economist at National Australia Bank.

"It's just a horrible idea," he said.

The Republicans' theory is that bondholders would accept a brief delay in interest payments -- maybe a couple of days -- if it meant Washington finally addressed its long-term fiscal problems, putting the country in a stronger position to meet its debt obligations later on.

But interviews with government officials and investors show they consider a default such a grim -- and remote -- possibility that it was nearly impossible to imagine.

"It just wouldn't happen," said Barry Evans, who oversees $83 billion in fixed income assets at Manulife Asset Management. "They would pay their Treasury bills first instead of other bills. It's as simple as that.

As for China, Washington's largest foreign creditor with $1.14 trillion in Treasuries as of March, a default could fray political and economic ties.

Yuan Gangming, a researcher with the government think tank Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, smelled some political wrangling behind the US debt debate as the 2012 presidential election draws nearer and said Republicans "want to make things difficult for Obama.

But with time running short before Treasury exhausts its borrowing room, Yuan said default was a real risk.

"The possibility is quite high to see a default of the US debt, which would harm many countries in the world, and China in particular," he said.



China warns U.S. debt-default idea is "playing with fire"

Emily Kaiser

(Reuters) - Republican lawmakers are "playing with fire" by contemplating even a brief debt default as a means to force deeper government spending cuts, an adviser to China's central bank said on Wednesday.

The idea of a technical default -- essentially delaying interest payments for a few days -- has gained backing from a growing number of mainstream Republicans who see it as a price worth paying if it forces the White House to slash spending, Reuters reported on Tuesday.

But any form of default could destabilize the global economy and sour already tense relations with big U.S. creditors such as China, government officials and investors warn.

Li Daokui, an adviser to the People's Bank of China, said a default could undermine the U.S. dollar, and Beijing needed to dissuade Washington from pursuing this course of action.

"I think there is a risk that the U.S. debt default may happen," Li told reporters on the sidelines of a forum in Beijing. "The result will be very serious and I really hope that they would stop playing with fire."

China is the largest foreign creditor to the United States, holding more than $1 trillion in Treasury debt as of March, U.S. data shows, so its concerns carry considerable weight in Washington.

I really worry about the risks of a U.S. debt default, which I think may lead to a decline in the dollar's value," Li said.

Congress has balked at increasing a statutory limit on government spending as lawmakers argue over how to curb a deficit which is projected to reach $1.4 trillion this fiscal year. The U.S. Treasury Department has said it will run out of borrowing room by August 2.

If the United States cannot make interest payments on its debt, the Obama administration has warned of "catastrophic" consequences that could push the still-fragile economy back into recession.

It has dire implications for the economy at a time when the macro data is softening," said Ben Westmore, a commodities economist at National Australia Bank.

"It's just a horrible idea," he said.

Financial markets are following the U.S. debate but see little risk of a default.

U.S. Treasury prices were firm in Europe on Wednesday, supported by a flight to their perceived safety on the back of the Greek debt crisis and worries about a slowdown in U.S. economic growth.

Marc Ostwald, a strategist with Monument Securities in London, said markets were working on the assumption that the U.S. debt story "will go away." But nervousness would grow if a resolution was not reached in the next five to six weeks.

'WOULDN'T HAPPEN'

The Republicans' theory is that bondholders would accept a brief delay in interest payments if it meant Washington finally addressed its long-term fiscal problems, putting the country in a stronger position to meet its debt obligations later on.

But interviews with government officials and investors show they consider a default such a grim -- and remote -- possibility that it was nearly impossible to imagine.

"How can the U.S. be allowed to default?" said an official at India's central bank. "We don't think this is a possibility because this could then create huge panic globally."

Indian officials say they have little choice but to buy U.S. Treasury debt because it is still among the world's safest and most liquid investments. It held $39.8 billion in U.S. Treasuries as of March, U.S. data shows.

The officials declined to be identified because they are not authorized to speak to the media.

Oman is concerned about the impact of a default on the currency reserves of the sultanate and its Gulf neighbors.

"Our economies are substantially tied up with the U.S. financial developments," said a senior central bank official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

"It just wouldn't happen," said Barry Evans, who oversees $83 billion in fixed income assets at Manulife Asset Management. "They would pay their Treasury bills first instead of other bills. It's as simple as that."

Monument's Ostwald called the default scenario "frightening" and said bondholders' patience would wear thin if lawmakers persisted in pitching this strategy in the coming weeks.

"This isn't a debate, this is like a Mexican standoff and that is where the problem lies," he said.

Yuan Gangming, a researcher with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government think tank, smelled some political wrangling behind the U.S. debt debate as the 2012 presidential election draws nearer and said Republicans "want to make things difficult for Obama."

But with time running short before the U.S. Treasury exhausts its borrowing room, Yuan said default was a real risk.

"The possibility is quite high to see a default of the U.S. debt, which would harm many countries in the world, and China in particular," he said.

(Reporting by Kevin Lim and Jong Woo Cheon in Singapore, Suvashree Dey Choudhury in Mumbai, Aileen Wang and Kevin Yao in Beijing, Abhijit Neogy in Delhi, Marius Zaharia in London and Umesh Desai in Hong Kong; Editing by Dean Yates and Neil Fullick)



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