Tension over exchange rates
WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN
Amid heightened fears over eurozone sovereign debt risks and  increasing concerns about the health of the 
United States and eurozone  economies, worried investors have flocked to the safety of haven  currencies, especially the 
Swiss franc, and gold.
While investors  and speculators have since moved aggressively to buy gold, the switch  from being large sellers to buying by a number of emerging nation's  central banks (Mexico, Russia, South Korea and Thailand) has helped  propel the price of gold more than 25% higher this year, hitting a  record US$1,920 a troy ounce earlier this month. At a time of high  uncertainty in the face of the 
International Monetary Fund's (IMF)  latest gloomy forecast on global growth, few central banks relish the  prospect of a flood of international cash pushing their currencies  higher.
Massive over-valuation of their currencies poses an acute  threat to their economic well-being, and carries the risk of deflation.
The Swiss franc
Switzerland's national currency, the CHF, should be used to speculative attacks by now. So much so in the 1970s, the 
Swiss National Bank (SNB) was forced to impose negative interest rates on foreign investors (who have to pay banks to accept their CHF deposits).
And,  it has been true in recent years, with the CHF rising by 43% against  the euro since the start of 2010 until mid-August this year. There does  not seem to be an alternative to the CHF as a safe haven at the moment.
With  what's going on in the United States, eurozone and Japan, investors  have lost faith in the world's two other haven currencies: 
US dollar  (USD) and the yen.
This reflects the Federal Reserves'  ultra-loose policy stance and the political fiscal impasse in the United  States which have scared away investments from the dollar. The prospect  that Tokyo might once again intervene to limit the yen's strength has  deterred speculators from betting on further gains from it. To be fair,  the CHF has also benefitted from recent signs that the 
Swiss economy,  thanks in large part to its close ties to a resurgent Germany, is  thriving.
But enough is enough. SNB made a surprising  announcement on Sept 6 that it would buy foreign currencies in  “unlimited quantities” to combat a huge over-valuation of the CHF, and  keep the franc-euro exchange rate above 1.20 with the “utmost  determination.”
On Aug 9, the CHF reached a new record, touching  near parity against the euro from 1.25 at the start of the year, while  the USD sank to almost CHF 0.70 (from 0.93). The impact so far has been  positive: the euro rose 8% on that day and the 1.20 franc level had  since stabilised. It was a gamble.
Of course, SNB had intervened  before in 2009 and 2010, but in a limited way at a time when the euro  was far stronger. But this time, with the nation's economy buckling  under the currency's massive over-valuation, the risks of doing nothing  were far greater. In July last year, following a chequered history of  frustrated attempts, SNB vowed it would not intervene again. By then,  the central bank was already awash with foreign currency reserves.  Worse, the CHF value of these reserves plunged as the currency  strengthened. In 2010, SNB recorded a loss of CHF20 billion, and a  further CHF10 billion in 1H'11. As a result, SNB came under severe  political pressure for not paying the expected dividend. But exporters  also demanded further intervention to stop the continuing appreciation.
This  time, SNB is up against a stubborn euro-debt crisis which just won't go  away. True, recent efforts have been credible. Indeed, the 1.20 francs  looks defensible, even though the CHF remains over-valued. Fair value  appears to be closer to 1.30-1.40. But inflation is low; still, the risk  of asset-price bubbles remains. What's worrisome is SNB acted alone.  For the 
European Central Bank (ECB),  the danger lies in SNB's eventual purchases of higher quality German  and French eurozone government bonds with the intervention receipts,  countering the ECB's own intervention in the bond market to help weaker  members of 
Europe's monetary union, including Italy and Spain.
This  causes the spread between the yields of these bonds to widen, and pile  on further pressure on peripheral economies. Furthermore, unlimited  Swiss buying of euro would push up its value, adding to deflationary  pressures in the region.
The devil's trade-off
As I  see it, the Swiss really has no other options. SNB has been attempting  to drive down the CHF by intervening in the money markets but with  little lasting effect. “The current massive over-valuation of the CHF  poses an acute threat to the Swiss economy,” where exports accounted for  35% of its gross domestic product. The new policy would help exports  and help job security. As of now, there is no support from Europe to  drive the euro higher.
SNB is caught in the “devil's trade-off,”  having to choose risking its balance sheet rather than risk “mounting  unemployment, deflation and economic damage.” The move is bound to cause  distortions and tension over exchange rates globally.
New haven: the Nokkie'
SNB's  new policy stance has sent ripples through currency markets. In Europe,  it drove the Norwegian krone (Nokkie) to an eight-year high against the  euro as investors sought out alternative safe havens. Since money funds  must have a minimum exposure in Europe and, with most European  currencies discredited and quality bonds yielding next to nothing, the  Nokkie became a principal beneficiary. It offers 3% return for  three-month money-market holdings.
Elsewhere, the 
Swedish krona  also gained ground, rising to its strongest level against the euro since  June after its central bank left its key interest rates unchanged,  while signalling that the rate will only creep up. What's worrisome is  that if there is continuing upward pressure on the Nokkie or the krona,  their central banks would act, if needed with taxes and exchange  controls. With interest rates at or near zero and fiscal policy  exhausted or ruled out politically in the most advanced nations,  currencies remain one of the only policy tools left.
At a time of  high uncertainty, investors are looking for havens. Apart from gold and  some real assets, few countries would welcome fresh inflows which can  stir to over-value currencies. Like it or not, speculative capital will  still find China and Indonesia particularly attractive.
Yen resists the pressure 
SNB's  placement of a “cap” to weaken the CHF has encouraged risk-adverse  investors who sought comfort in the franc to turn to the yen instead. So  far, the yen has stayed below its record high reached in mid-August.  But it remains well above the exporters' comfort level.
Indeed, the 
Bank of Japan (BoJ)  has signalled its readiness to ease policy to help as global growth  falters. But so far, the authorities are happy just monitoring and  indications are they will resist pressure to be as bold as the Swiss,  for three main reasons: (i) unlike to CHF, the yen is not deemed to be  particularly strong at this time it's roughly in line with its 30-year  average; (ii) unlike SNB, Japan is expected to respect the G-7's  commitment to market determined exchange rates; and (iii) Japan's  economy is five times the size of Switzerland and the yen trading volume  makes defending a pre-set rate in the global markets well-nigh  impractical.
Still, they have done so on three occasions over the  past 12 months: a record 4.51 trillion yen sell-off on Aug 9  (surpassing the previous daily record of 2.13 trillion yen from Sept  2010).
The operation briefly pushed the USD to 80.25 yen (from  77.1 yen) but the effects quickly waned and the dollar fell back to a  record low of 75.9 yen on Aug 19. But, I gather the Finance Ministry  needs to meet three conditions for intervention: (a) the yen/USD rate  has to be volatile; (b) a simultaneous easing by BoJ; and (c)  intervention restricted to one day only.
Given these constraints,  it is no wonder MOF has failed to arrest the yen's underlying trend. In  the end, I think the Japanese has learnt to live with it unlike the  Swiss who has the motivation and means to resist a strong currency.
Reprieve for the yuan 
I  sense one of the first casualties of the failing global economic  expansion is renewed pressure to further appreciate the yuan. For China,  August was a good month to adjust strong exports, high inflation and  intense international pressure. As a result, the yuan appreciated  against the USD by more than 11%, up from an average of about 5% in the  first seven months of the year. However, the surge had begun to fade in  the first half of September.
But with the United States and  eurozone economic outlook teetering in gloom, China's latest  manufacturing performance had also weakened, reflecting falling overseas  demand.
This makes imposing additional currency pressure on  exporters a no-go. Meanwhile, inflation has stabilised. Crude oil and  imported food prices have declined, reducing inflationary pressure and  the incentive to further appreciate the yuan. Looks like September  provided a period of some relief. But, make no mistake, the pressure is  still there. The fading global recovery may have papered over the  cracks. Pressure won't grind to a halt.
Central banks  instinctively try to ward-off massive capital flows appreciating their  currencies. There are similarities between what's happening today,  highlighted by the recent defensive move by SNB, and the tension over  exchange rates at last year-end. It's an exercise in pushing the problem  next door.
This can be viewed as a consequence of recent  Japanese action (Tokyo's repeated intervention to sell yen). It  threatens to start a chain of responses where every central bank tries  to weaken its currency in the face of poor global economic prospects and  growing uncertainty. So far, the tension has not risen to anything like  last year's level. But with rising political pressure provoking  resistance to currency appreciation, the potential for a fresh outbreak  remains real. The Brazilian Finance Minister just repeated his warning  last year that continuing loose US monetary policies could stoke a  currency war.
Growing stress
With the euro under  growing stress from sovereign debt problems, the market's focus is  turning back to Japan (prompting a new plan to deal with a strong yen),  to non-eurozone nations (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and possibly the United  Kingdom) and on to Asia (already the ringgit, rupiah, baht and won are  coming under pressure on concerns over uncertainty and capital flight).  Similarly, Brazil's recent actions to limit currency appreciation  highlights the dilemma faced by fast growing economies (Turkey, Chile  and Russia) since allowing currency appreciation limits domestic  overheating but also undermines competitiveness.
This low level currency war between emerging and advanced economies had further unsettled financial markets.
Given  the weak economic outlook, most governments would prefer to see their  currencies weaken to help exports. The risk, as in the 1930s, is not  just “beggar-thy-neighbour” devaluations but resort to a wide range of  trade barriers as well. Globally co-ordinated policies under G-20 are  preferred. But that's easier said than done.
So, it is timely for  the IMF's September “World Economic Outlook” to warn of “severe  repercussions” to the global economy as the United States and eurozone  could face recession and a “lost decade” of growth (a replay of Japan in  the 90s) unless nations revamped economic policies. For the United  States, this means less reliance on debt and putting its fiscal house in  order.
For the eurozone, firm resolution of the debt crisis,  including strengthening its banking system. For China, increased  reliance on domestic demand. And, for Brazil, cooling an over-heating  economy. This weekend, the G-20 is expected to take-up global efforts to  rebalance the world overwhelmed by heightened risks to growth and the  deepening debt crisis. Focus is expected on the role of exchange rates  in rebalancing growth, piling more pressure on China's yuan.
Frankly,  IMF meetings and G-20 gatherings don't have a track record of getting  things done. I don't expect anything different this time. The outlook  just doesn't look good.
 Former banker, Dr Lin is a  Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now  spends time writing, teaching and promoting public interest. Feedback is  most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.