Restoring unity at South China Sea
I DON’T usually pay attention to Asean meetings as there are so many
of them but the disappointing outcome of the recently concluded Asean
Ministers Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh caught my attention.
The failure of the meeting to come up with a joint communiqué was striking even to casual observers.
The failure, the first in the bloc’s 45-year history, caused by disagreement among Asean members over the South China Sea dispute, was a worrying development that has cast doubts over its ability to speak in unison on this thorny issue.
The last thing Asean needs is to be caught in a turf war for superpowers in its own backyard.
The South China Sea, which is so crucial not only to the littoral states but to the international community at large, could well be that stage.
China has been seen by many as acting “assertively” in backing its claim of the sea and has been involved in several stand-offs with Vietnam and the Philippines, which have also reacted strongly against China in those situations.
I wonder if Malaysia, as a claimant state, should start thinking of having in place specific contingency plans to confront the kinds of situation that Vietnam and the Philippines have faced against China.
I know Malaysia enjoys close bilateral and people-to-people relations with China. Beijing has even described us as a “special friend”.
Despite this, let us be reminded that China also has deep relations with Vietnam and the Philippines.
It even has nearly inextricable economic and strategic relations with the United States, a potential adversary and with whom it has clashing interests in the sea.
I am not schooled in the fine art of international relations but I believe nations should not always think the best of others and must be prepared to face any eventuality.
In the context of the South China Sea, such eventualities should include facing potentially hostile and intrusive acts of our neighbours which can undermine our interests.
Any one of the claimant states can turn adversarial but I believe we have to pay special attention to China.
Its recent actions such as patrolling disputed waters and deploying a garrison at Sansha city to impose its jurisdiction all point towards Beijing’s readiness and resolve to assert its claims.
What would Malaysia do should we find the cables of our offshore exploration vessels cut by a Chinese vessel or if Chinese surveillance and patrol vessels appear in our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), situations which Vietnam and the Philippines have faced?
I believe Malaysia should prepare contingency plans to face such situations. Merely reacting to developments in this high-stake theatre would not be good enough.
The tense situation underscores the need for a binding code to govern the behaviour of the claimants.
Such a code will compel them to settle their disputes through peaceful means and using international law.
While I noticed progress between Asean and China to come up with guidelines for the Declaration of Conduct in the sea between them, they still have a long way to go before they can agree on a Code of Conduct.
On the outcome of the AMM meeting in Phnom Penh and China’s refusal to discuss disputes multilaterally, I foresee a prolonged impasse. At the rate things are going, I don’t see China changing tangent of not wanting to discuss the dispute multilaterally.
The Code of Conduct that Asean and China are working to establish would not be efficient if it did not include all the claimants. In this regard, one wonders if it would make sense to include Taiwan, which is also a claimant in the sea, to be a party to such a code.
It would not make sense to ignore this claimant in the construct of a code to govern the conduct of claimant states. What set of conduct then would Taiwan be subjected to if the Code of Conduct is agreed only between Asean and China?
Besides ensuring that everyone plays by the same rules, bringing Taiwan into the fold could help yield fresh perspectives to the discourse on disputes at sea, which to me seems to be getting nowhere.
Taiwan has much to offer in areas such as marine scientific research, fishery management/conservation, environmental protection, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and search and rescue.
The claimant and littoral states could tap into Taiwan’s expertise in these areas and promote cooperation, build confidence and avert further tension.
I hope my take on the subject would provide food for thought to claimant states and prompt them to set aside differences and work together towards peace.
I believe Malaysia as a claimant state should not only be steadfast in safeguarding its interests but should also show initiative to promote peace.
Malaysia can leverage its position as a founding member of Asean and as a friend to claimant states and the United States to be a voice of reason.
With the statesmanship skills of our diplomats we can help restore unity in Asean that was shaken in the aftermath of the AMM in Phnom Penh, restore confidence between Asean and China, and reassert Asean’s centrality in regional security matters.
The failure of the meeting to come up with a joint communiqué was striking even to casual observers.
The failure, the first in the bloc’s 45-year history, caused by disagreement among Asean members over the South China Sea dispute, was a worrying development that has cast doubts over its ability to speak in unison on this thorny issue.
The last thing Asean needs is to be caught in a turf war for superpowers in its own backyard.
The South China Sea, which is so crucial not only to the littoral states but to the international community at large, could well be that stage.
China has been seen by many as acting “assertively” in backing its claim of the sea and has been involved in several stand-offs with Vietnam and the Philippines, which have also reacted strongly against China in those situations.
I wonder if Malaysia, as a claimant state, should start thinking of having in place specific contingency plans to confront the kinds of situation that Vietnam and the Philippines have faced against China.
I know Malaysia enjoys close bilateral and people-to-people relations with China. Beijing has even described us as a “special friend”.
Despite this, let us be reminded that China also has deep relations with Vietnam and the Philippines.
It even has nearly inextricable economic and strategic relations with the United States, a potential adversary and with whom it has clashing interests in the sea.
I am not schooled in the fine art of international relations but I believe nations should not always think the best of others and must be prepared to face any eventuality.
In the context of the South China Sea, such eventualities should include facing potentially hostile and intrusive acts of our neighbours which can undermine our interests.
Any one of the claimant states can turn adversarial but I believe we have to pay special attention to China.
Its recent actions such as patrolling disputed waters and deploying a garrison at Sansha city to impose its jurisdiction all point towards Beijing’s readiness and resolve to assert its claims.
What would Malaysia do should we find the cables of our offshore exploration vessels cut by a Chinese vessel or if Chinese surveillance and patrol vessels appear in our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), situations which Vietnam and the Philippines have faced?
I believe Malaysia should prepare contingency plans to face such situations. Merely reacting to developments in this high-stake theatre would not be good enough.
The tense situation underscores the need for a binding code to govern the behaviour of the claimants.
Such a code will compel them to settle their disputes through peaceful means and using international law.
While I noticed progress between Asean and China to come up with guidelines for the Declaration of Conduct in the sea between them, they still have a long way to go before they can agree on a Code of Conduct.
On the outcome of the AMM meeting in Phnom Penh and China’s refusal to discuss disputes multilaterally, I foresee a prolonged impasse. At the rate things are going, I don’t see China changing tangent of not wanting to discuss the dispute multilaterally.
The Code of Conduct that Asean and China are working to establish would not be efficient if it did not include all the claimants. In this regard, one wonders if it would make sense to include Taiwan, which is also a claimant in the sea, to be a party to such a code.
It would not make sense to ignore this claimant in the construct of a code to govern the conduct of claimant states. What set of conduct then would Taiwan be subjected to if the Code of Conduct is agreed only between Asean and China?
Besides ensuring that everyone plays by the same rules, bringing Taiwan into the fold could help yield fresh perspectives to the discourse on disputes at sea, which to me seems to be getting nowhere.
Taiwan has much to offer in areas such as marine scientific research, fishery management/conservation, environmental protection, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and search and rescue.
The claimant and littoral states could tap into Taiwan’s expertise in these areas and promote cooperation, build confidence and avert further tension.
I hope my take on the subject would provide food for thought to claimant states and prompt them to set aside differences and work together towards peace.
I believe Malaysia as a claimant state should not only be steadfast in safeguarding its interests but should also show initiative to promote peace.
Malaysia can leverage its position as a founding member of Asean and as a friend to claimant states and the United States to be a voice of reason.
With the statesmanship skills of our diplomats we can help restore unity in Asean that was shaken in the aftermath of the AMM in Phnom Penh, restore confidence between Asean and China, and reassert Asean’s centrality in regional security matters.
SON OF THE SEA
Kuala Lumpur
China Pushes on the South China Sea, ASEAN Unity Collapses
Publication: China Brief Volume: 12 Issue: 15
August 3, 2012
China and ASEAN Much Further Apart than the Smiles Suggest
For
more than two decades Beijing has pursued a consistent policy in the
South China Sea composed of two main elements: gradually strengthening
the country’s territorial and jurisdictional claims while at the same
time endeavoring to assure Southeast Asian countries of its peaceful
intentions. Recent moves by China to bolster its maritime claims have
brought the first element into sharp relief, while reassurances of
benign intent have, however, been in short supply. Indeed, far from
assuaging Southeast Asian concerns regarding its assertive behavior,
China has fuelled them by brazenly exploiting divisions within the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to further its own
national interests.
China Hardens Its Stance
Commentaries
in China’s state-run media analyzing the South China Sea issue have
become markedly less conciliatory. Opinion pieces highlight several new
themes in China’s official line. One theme is that China’s territory,
sovereignty as well as its maritime rights and interests increasingly
are being challenged by Southeast Asian nations and Japan in the South
and East China Seas. China’s response, it is argued, should be to uphold
its claims more vigorously, increase its military presence in contested
waters, and, if necessary, be prepared to implement coercive measures
against other countries. As one commentary notes “Cooperation must be in
good faith, competition must be strong, and confrontation must be
resolute” (Caixin, July 13).
Another
theme is that, while China has shown restraint, countries such as the
Philippines and Vietnam have been pursuing provocative and illegal
actions in a bid to “plunder” maritime resources such as hydrocarbons
and fisheries which China regards as its own (China Daily, July 30).
A
third theme is that Manila and Hanoi continue to encourage U.S.
“meddling” in the South China Sea and that the United States uses the
dispute as a pretext to “pivot” its military forces toward Asia (Global Times,
July 11). To reverse these negative trends, Chinese commentators have
urged the government to adopt more resolute measures toward disputed
territories and maritime boundaries. Nationalist sentiment, they argue,
demands no less.
Recent
measures undertaken by the Chinese authorities do indeed suggest a more
hard-line position. Ominously, some of the initiatives have included a
strong military element, presumably as a warning to the other claimants
that China is ready to play hardball.
Perhaps
the most noteworthy attempt by China to bolster its jurisdictional
claims in the South China Sea was the raising of the administrative
status of Sansha from county to prefecture level in June. Sansha
originally was established in 2007 as an administrative mechanism to
“govern” the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands.
Sansha’s elevation was an immediate response to a law passed on June 21 by
Vietnam’s national assembly, which reiterated Hanoi’s sovereignty
claims to the Paracels and Spratlys. Both Vietnam and China protested
the other’s move as a violation of their sovereignty (Bloomberg, June
21). Less than a month later, Sansha’s municipal authorities elected a
mayor and three deputy mayors and China’s Central Military Commission
authorized the establishment of a garrison for “managing the city’s
national defense mobilization, military reserves and carrying out
military operations (Xinhua, July 20).
Earlier,
in late June, China’s Defense Ministry announced it had begun “combat
ready” patrols in the Spratly Islands to “protect national sovereignty
and [China’s] security development interests” (Reuters, June 28).
Embarrassingly for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, however, on
July 13, one of its frigates ran aground on Half Moon Shoal, 70 miles
west of the Philippine island of Palawan and within the Philippines 200
nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The frigate was refloated
within 24 hours, suggesting that other PLA Navy vessels were nearby when
the incident occurred. These developments provide further evidence of
the growing militarization of the dispute.
China
also has moved to undercut the claims and commercial activities of the
Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea in other ways.
In
June, the state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)
invited foreign energy companies to bid for exploration rights in nine
blocks in the South China Sea. The blocks lie completely within
Vietnam’s EEZ and overlap with those offered for development to foreign
energy corporations by state-owned PetroVietnam. Accordingly, Hanoi
vigorously protested CNOOC’s tender (Bloomberg, June 27). More
importantly the blocks are located at the edge of China’s nine-dash line
map and seem to support the argument that Beijing interprets the dashes
as representing the outermost limits of its “historic rights” in the
South China Sea. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), however, coastal states are not entitled to “historic
rights” on the high seas. It is therefore unlikely that any of the major
energy giants will bid for CNOOC’s blocks—although smaller companies
may do so if only to curry favor with Beijing with a view to landing
more lucrative contracts down the road. If, however, exploration does
move forward in any of the nine blocks, a clash between Vietnamese and
Chinese coast guard vessels will become a very real possibility.
On
the issue of ownership of Scarborough Shoal, scene of a tense standoff
between Chinese and Philippines fishery protection vessels in May-June,
China position remains uncompromising. At the annual ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in July, Chinese Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi restated China’s sovereignty claims to the shoal, rejected
the notion that it was disputed and accused Manila of “making trouble”
(Xinhua, July 13). According to the Philippine foreign ministry, Chinese
trawlers―protected by Chinese paramilitary vessels—continue to fish in
waters close to Scarborough Shoal in contravention of a bilateral accord
whereby both sides agreed to withdraw their vessels [1].
Following
the ARF, China kept up the pressure on the Philippines. In mid-July, it
dispatched a flotilla of 30 fishing trawlers to the Spratlys escorted
by the 3,000-ton fisheries administration vessel Yuzheng 310 (Xinhua,
July 15). The trawlers collected coral and fished near
Philippine-controlled Pag-asa Island and Chinese-controlled Mischief and
Subi Reefs (Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 27). The Philippine authorities monitored the situation but took no action.
The Phnom Penh Debacle
In
the past, after China has undertaken assertive actions in the South
China Sea it has tried to calm Southeast Asia’s jangled nerves. At the
series of ASEAN-led meetings in Phnom Penh in mid-July, however, Chinese
officials offered virtually no reassurances to their Southeast Asian
counterparts. Worse still, China seems to have utilized its influence
with Cambodia to scupper attempts by ASEAN to address the problem,
causing a breakdown in ASEAN unity.
In
the final stages of the annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers
(known as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting or AMM), the Philippines and
Vietnam wanted the final communiqué to reflect their serious concerns
regarding the Scarborough Shoal incident and the CNOOC tender. They were
supported by Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand who felt that
ASEAN should speak with one voice. Cambodia—which holds the rotating
chairmanship of ASEAN and has close political and economic ties with
China— objected because, in the words of Foreign Minister Hor Namhong,
“ASEAN cannot be used as a tribunal for bilateral disputes” (Straits Times,
July 22). Attempts by Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to
reach a compromise on the wording were unsuccessful and for the first
time in its 45-year history the AMM did not issue a final communiqué.
The
fallout from the AMM was immediate and ugly. Natalegawa labelled
ASEAN’s failure to reach agreement “irresponsible” and that the
organization’s centrality in the building of the regional security
architecture had been put at risk (Straits Times, July 16). Singapore’s Foreign Minister, K. Shanmugam described the fiasco as a “sever dent” in ASEAN’s credibility (Straits Times,
July 14). Cambodia and the Philippines blamed the failure on each
other. Cambodia was pilloried by the regional press for its lack of
leadership and for putting its bilateral relationship with China before
the overall interests of ASEAN. One analyst alleged Cambodian
officials had consulted with their Chinese counterparts during the
final stages of talks to reach an agreement on the communiqué [2].
China’s Global Times
characterized the outcome of the AMM as a victory for China, which does
not think ASEAN is an appropriate venue to discuss the dispute, and a
defeat for the Philippines and Vietnam (Global Times, July 16).
A
few days after the AMM, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
dispatched his foreign minister to five Southeast Asian capitals in an
effort to restore ASEAN unity. Natalegawa’s shuttle diplomacy resulted
in an ASEAN foreign minister’s statement of July 20 on “ASEAN’s
Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea” [3]. The six points,
however, broke no new ground and merely reaffirmed ASEAN’s bottom line
consensus on the South China Sea. In response to the joint statement,
China’s Foreign Ministry said it would work with ASEAN to implement the
2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC)
(Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 21).
One
of the six points calls for the early conclusion of a code of conduct
(CoC) for the South China Sea, but the Phnom Penh debacle has made that
target highly doubtful.
Although
China agreed to discuss a CoC with ASEAN in November 2011, Beijing
always has been lukewarm about such an agreement, preferring instead to
focus on implementing the DoC. Undeterred, earlier this year ASEAN began
drawing up guiding principles for a code and in June agreed on a set of
“proposed elements.” While much of the document is standard boiler
plate, there are two aspects worthy of attention.
The
first is that ASEAN calls for a “comprehensive and durable” settlement
of the dispute, a phrase that seems to repudiate Deng Xiaoping’s
proposal that the parties should shelve their sovereignty claims and
jointly develop maritime resources. Clearly, the four ASEAN claimants
have rejected Deng’s formula as it would be tantamount to recognizing
China’s “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea atolls.
The
second interesting aspect concerns mechanisms for resolving disputes
arising from violations or interpretations of the proposed code. The
document suggests that disputing parties turn to the 1976 Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) or dispute resolution mechanisms in UNCLOS.
Neither, however, would be of much utility. While the TAC does provide
for a dispute resolution mechanism in the form of an ASEAN High Council,
this clause has never been invoked due to the highly politicized nature
of the High Council and the fact that it cannot issue binding rulings.
Moreover, although China acceded to the TAC in 2003, Beijing almost
certainly would oppose discussion of the South China Sea at the High
Council because it would be outnumbered 10 to 1.
UNCLOS
does provide for binding dispute resolution mechanisms, including the
submission of disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or
the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). China always
has rejected a role for the ICJ in resolving the territorial disputes in
the South China Sea and, in 2006, China exercised its right to opt out
of ITLOS procedures concerning maritime boundary delimitation and
military activities.
On
July 9, Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying had indicated to ASEAN foreign
ministers that China was willing to start talks on a CoC in September.
Two days later, however, as ASEAN wrangled over their final communiqué,
Foreign Minister Yang seemed to rule this out when he stated discussions
could only take place “when the time was ripe” (Straits Times, July
11). At present ASEAN and China are not scheduled to hold any meetings
on the CoC, though officials currently are discussing joint cooperative
projects under the DoC.
If
and when the two sides do sit down to discuss the CoC, it is probable
that Beijing will demand all reference to dispute resolution be removed
on the grounds that the proposed code is designed to manage tensions
only and that the dispute can only be resolved between China and each of
the other claimants on a one-on-one basis. Taken together, these
developments have dimmed seriously the prospect of China and ASEAN
reaching agreement on a viable code of conduct for the South China Sea
any time soon. As such, the status quo will continue for the foreseeable
future.
Notes:
- “Why There was no ASEAN Joint Communique,” Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, July 19, 2012 http://www.dfa.gov.ph/main/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases/5950-why-there-was-no-asean-joint-communique-.
- Ernest Bower, “China reveals its hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 20 2012.
- “Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea,” Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 20, 2012 http://www.mfaic.gov.kh/mofa/default.aspx?id=3206.
