It is imperative for banks to have a better prediction of their losses so that their capital position will be better reflected
IT may seem strange to analyse bank losses at a time when major banks, even the taxpayer-owned ones, are profitable.
Moreover, major economies are also said to be turning around. So why would we be so worried about bank losses?
According the analysts at Barclays, this is related to the bank's risk-weighted assets.
With
so much focus on capital and the need to boost capital for the
taxpayer-owned banks, it is inevitable that the question on losses would
pop up.
That's when the banks accurately forecast the capital required.
However,
if they do not have a fairly accurate idea of the losses they may be
incurring, they may not be allocating enough capital buffer for it.
Therefore,
the analysis on bank losses should be seen in a positive light as it
helps to shed information early on the capital position of the bank.
The
startling fact is that the banks themselves may not be able to predict
their losses with a fair degree of accuracy, said the Telegraph.
UK,
European and Asian banks, on average, forecast losses of nearly 30%
higher than those they actually faced, the survey by analysts at
Barclays found.
According to the report, Lloyds and HSBC
predicted a default rate on their lending portfolios more than 50% above
what they actually experienced.
Barclays was found to have been
too pessimistic, particularly with assets in its investment bank where
it forecast a default rate 78% higher than in reality.
“Most of
the time banks' PDs (predicted defaults) are lower than forecast,
suggesting a degree of conservatism,” the analysts said, as quoted by
the Telegraph.
“The forecasting errors' can be massive,
which raises questions over both their predictability and hence
meaningfulness of the resulting risk weighted assets,'' they said.
It
is therefore imperative for banks to have a better prediction of their
losses so that their capital position will be better reflected.
Banks' boards of directors are fortifying themselves with new knowledge.
HSBC,
the largest British bank, has appointed former director-general of
British Security Service, Sir Jonathan Evans, onto its board, with
expertise in counter terrorism and cyber threats.
With the
accusations of money laundering, these major banks are coughing up a lot
of money to engage top guns that can deal with the intricacies of it
all.
Before terrorim, it was risk posed by over dabbling in derivatives. Banks engaged armies of risk and compliance oficers
Whether these counterrorism and cyber threat themes really emerge into trends remains to be seen.
A survey by pension fund The Scottish Widow indicated that in 10 years' time, Britons will have to work till 70.
They do not have enough savings to last through, as they are currently caught up in daily living expenses, it was reported in The Guardian.
That sounds chilling but fast becomig a reality soon in many other countries.
Many will start rushing for health and pharmaceutical products to strengthen themselves while others will just struggle on.
>Columnist Yap Leng Kuen reckons it's easier to think positive.
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Showing posts with label Barclays. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Barclays. Show all posts
Thursday, June 6, 2013
Saturday, August 25, 2012
The Libor fuss!
The story behind the Libor scandal
SINCE the outbreak of the Libor scandal, readers' reaction has ranged from the very basic: What's this Libor? to the more mundane: How does it affect me?
Some friends have raised more critical questions: Barclays appears to have manipulated Libor to lower it; isn't that good? The problem first arose in early 2008; why isn't it resolved by now? By popular demand to demystify this very everydayness at which banks fix this far-reaching key rate, today's column will be devoted to going behind the scandal starting from the very basics about the mechanics of fixing the rate, to what really happened (why Barclays paid the huge fines in settlement), to its impact and how to fix the problem.
What's Libor
The London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (Libor) was first conceived in the 1980s as a trusty yardstick to measure the cost (interest rate) of short-term funds which highly-rated banks borrow from one another. Each day at 11am in London, the setting process at the British Bankers' Association (BBA) gets moving, recording submissions by a select group of global banks (including three large US banks) estimates of the perceived rates they would pay to borrow unsecured in “reasonable market size” for various currencies and for different maturities.
Libor is then calculated using a “trimmed” average, excluding the highest and lowest 25% of the submissions. Within minutes, the benchmark rates flash on to thousands and thousands of traders' screens around the world, and ripple onto the prices of loans, derivatives contracts and other financial instruments worth many, many times the global GDP. Indeed, it has been estimated that the Libor-based financial market is worth US$800 trillion, affecting the prices that you and me and corporations around the world pay for loans or receive for their savings.
Indeed, anyone with a credit card, mortgage or car loan, or fixed deposit should care about their rate being manipulated by the banks that set them. In the end, it is used as a benchmark to determine payments on the global flow of financial instruments. Unfortunately, it turns out to have been flawed, bearing in mind Libor is not an interest rate controlled or even regulated directly by the central bank. It is an average set by BBA, a private trade body.
In practice, for working purposes, Libor rates are set essentially for 10 currencies and for 15 maturities. The most important of these relates to the 3-month US dollar, i.e. what a bank would pay to borrow US dollar for 3 months from other banks. It is set by a panel of 18 banks with the top 4 and bottom 4 estimates being discarded. Libor is the simple average (arithmetic mean) of what is left. All submissions are disclosed, along with the day's Libor fix. Its European counterpart, Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor), is similarly fixed in Brussels. However, Euribor banks are not asked (as in Libor) to provide estimates of what they think they could have to pay to borrow; merely estimates of what the borrowing rate between two “prime” banks should be. In practice, “prime” now refers to German banks. This simply means there is in the market a disconnect between the actual borrowing costs by banks across Europe and the benchmark. Today, Euribor is less than 1%, but Italian banks (say) have to pay 350-40 basis points above it. Around the world, there would similarly be Tibor (Tokyo Inter-Bank Offered Rate); Sibor and its related SOR (Swap-Offered Rate) in Singapore; Klibor in Kuala Lumpur; etc.
What's wrong with Libor?
Theoretically, if banks played by the rules, Libor will reflect what it's supposed to a reliable yardstick to measure what it cost banks to borrow from one another. The flaw is that, in practice, the system can be rigged. First, it is based on estimates, not actual prices at which banks have lent to or borrowed from one another. They are not transactions based, an omission that widens the scope for manipulation. Second, the bank's estimate is supposed to be ring-fenced from other parts of the bank. But unfortunately walls have “holes” often incentivised by vested-interest in profit making by the interest-rate derivatives trading arm of the business. The total market in such derivatives has been estimated at US$554 trillion in 2011. So, even small changes can imply big profits. Indeed, it has been reported that each basis point (0.01%) movement in Libor could reap a net profit of “a couple of million US dollar.”
The lack of transparency in the Libor setting mechanism has tended to exacerbate this urge to cheat. Since the scandal, damning evidence has emerged from probes by regulators in the UK and US, including whistle blowing by employees in a number of banks covering a past period of at least five years. More are likely to emerge from investigations in other nations, including Canada, Japan, EU and Switzerland. The probes cover some of the largest banks, including reportedly Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, UBS, HSBC and Deutsche Bank.
Why Barclays?
Based on what was since disclosed, the Libor scandal has set the stage for lawsuits and demands for more effective regulation the world over. It has led to renewed banker bashing and dented the reputation of the city of London. Barclays, a 300-year old British bank, is in the spotlight simply because it is the first bank to co-operate fully with regulators. It's just the beginning a matter of time before others will be put on the dock. The disclosures and evidence appear damaging. They reveal unacceptable behaviour at Barclays. Two sorts of motivation are discernible.
First, there is manipulation of Libor to trap higher profits in trading. Its traders very brazenly pushed its own money market dealers to manipulate their submissions for fixing Libor, including colluding with counter-parties at other banks. Evidence point to cartel-like association with others to fiddle Libor, with the view to profiteering (or reduce losses) on their derivative exposures. The upshot is that the bank profited from this bad behaviour. Even Bob Diamond, the outgoing Barclays CEO, admitted this doctoring of Libor in favour of the bank's trading positions was “reprehensible.”
Second, there is the rigging of Libor by submitting “lowered” rates at the onset of the credit crunch in 2007 when the authorities were perceived to be keen to bolster confidence in banks (to avoid bailouts) and keep credit flowing; while “higher” (but more realistic) rates submission would be regarded as a sign of its own financial weakness. It would appear in this context as some have argued that a “public good” of sorts was involved. In times of systemic banking crisis, regulators do have a clear motive for wanting a lower Libor. The rationale behind this approach was categorically invalidated by the Bank of England. Like it or not, Barclays has since been fined £290mil (US$450mil) by UK and US regulators for manipulating Libor (£60mil fine by the UK Financial Services Authority is the highest ever imposed even after a 30% discount because it co-operated).
Efforts at reform
Be that as it may, Libor is something of an anachronism, a throwback to a time long past when trust was more important than contract. Concern over Libor goes way back to the early 2008 when reform of the way it is determined was first mooted. BBA's system is akin to an auction. After all, auctions are commonly used to find prices where none exist. It has many variants: from the “English” auction used to sell rare paintings to the on-line auction (as in e-Bay). In the end, every action aims to elicit committed price data from bidders.
As I see it, a more credible Libor fixing system would need four key changes: (i) use of actual lending rates; (ii) outlaw (penalise) false bidding bidders need to be committed to their price; (iii) encourage non-banks also to join in the process to avoid collusion and cartelisation; and (iv) intrusively monitor the process by an outside regulator to ensure tougher oversight.
However, there are many practical challenges to the realisation of a new and improved Libor. Millions of contracts that are Libor-linked may have to be rewritten. This will be difficult and a herculean exercise in the face of lawsuits and ongoing investigations. Critical to well-intentioned reform is the will to change. But with lawsuits and prosecutions gathering pace, the BBA and banking fraternity have little choice but to rework Libor now. As I understand it, because gathering real data can often pose real problems especially at times of financial stress, the most likely solution could be a hybrid. Here, banks would continue to submit estimated cost, but would be required to back them with as many actuals as feasible. To be transparent, they might need to be audited ex-post. Such blending could offer a practical way out.
Like it or not, the global banking industry possibly faces what the Economist has since dubbed as its “tobacco moment,” referring to litigation and settlement that cost the US tobacco industry more than US$200bil in 1988. Sure, actions representing a wide-range of plaintiffs have been launched. But, the legal machinery will grind slowly. Among the claimants are savers in bonds and other instruments linked to Libor (or its equivalent), especially those dealing directly with banks involved in setting the rate. The legal process will prove complicated, where proof of “harm” can get very involved. For the banks face asymmetric risk because they act most of the time as intermediaries those who have “lost” will sue, but banks will be unable to claim from others who “gained.” Much also depends on whether the regulator “press” them to pay compensation; or in the event legal settlements get so large as to require new bailouts (for those too big to fail), to protect them. What a mess.
What, then, are we to do?
Eighty years ago banker JP Morgan jr was reported to have remarked in the midst of the Great Depression: “Since we have not more power of knowing the future than any other men, we have made many mistakes (who has not during the past five years?), but our mistakes have been errors of judgement and not of principle.” Indeed, bankers have since gone overboard and made some serious mistakes, from crimes against time honoured principles to downright fraud. Manipulating Libor is unacceptable. So much so bankers have since lost the public trust. It's about time to rebuild a robust but gentlemanly culture, based on the very best time-tested traditions of banking. They need to start right now.
Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who speaks, writes and consults on economic and financial issues. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.
Logos of 16 Banks Involved in Libor Scandal - YouTube
SINCE the outbreak of the Libor scandal, readers' reaction has ranged from the very basic: What's this Libor? to the more mundane: How does it affect me?
Some friends have raised more critical questions: Barclays appears to have manipulated Libor to lower it; isn't that good? The problem first arose in early 2008; why isn't it resolved by now? By popular demand to demystify this very everydayness at which banks fix this far-reaching key rate, today's column will be devoted to going behind the scandal starting from the very basics about the mechanics of fixing the rate, to what really happened (why Barclays paid the huge fines in settlement), to its impact and how to fix the problem.
What's Libor
The London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (Libor) was first conceived in the 1980s as a trusty yardstick to measure the cost (interest rate) of short-term funds which highly-rated banks borrow from one another. Each day at 11am in London, the setting process at the British Bankers' Association (BBA) gets moving, recording submissions by a select group of global banks (including three large US banks) estimates of the perceived rates they would pay to borrow unsecured in “reasonable market size” for various currencies and for different maturities.
Libor is then calculated using a “trimmed” average, excluding the highest and lowest 25% of the submissions. Within minutes, the benchmark rates flash on to thousands and thousands of traders' screens around the world, and ripple onto the prices of loans, derivatives contracts and other financial instruments worth many, many times the global GDP. Indeed, it has been estimated that the Libor-based financial market is worth US$800 trillion, affecting the prices that you and me and corporations around the world pay for loans or receive for their savings.
Indeed, anyone with a credit card, mortgage or car loan, or fixed deposit should care about their rate being manipulated by the banks that set them. In the end, it is used as a benchmark to determine payments on the global flow of financial instruments. Unfortunately, it turns out to have been flawed, bearing in mind Libor is not an interest rate controlled or even regulated directly by the central bank. It is an average set by BBA, a private trade body.
In practice, for working purposes, Libor rates are set essentially for 10 currencies and for 15 maturities. The most important of these relates to the 3-month US dollar, i.e. what a bank would pay to borrow US dollar for 3 months from other banks. It is set by a panel of 18 banks with the top 4 and bottom 4 estimates being discarded. Libor is the simple average (arithmetic mean) of what is left. All submissions are disclosed, along with the day's Libor fix. Its European counterpart, Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor), is similarly fixed in Brussels. However, Euribor banks are not asked (as in Libor) to provide estimates of what they think they could have to pay to borrow; merely estimates of what the borrowing rate between two “prime” banks should be. In practice, “prime” now refers to German banks. This simply means there is in the market a disconnect between the actual borrowing costs by banks across Europe and the benchmark. Today, Euribor is less than 1%, but Italian banks (say) have to pay 350-40 basis points above it. Around the world, there would similarly be Tibor (Tokyo Inter-Bank Offered Rate); Sibor and its related SOR (Swap-Offered Rate) in Singapore; Klibor in Kuala Lumpur; etc.
What's wrong with Libor?
Theoretically, if banks played by the rules, Libor will reflect what it's supposed to a reliable yardstick to measure what it cost banks to borrow from one another. The flaw is that, in practice, the system can be rigged. First, it is based on estimates, not actual prices at which banks have lent to or borrowed from one another. They are not transactions based, an omission that widens the scope for manipulation. Second, the bank's estimate is supposed to be ring-fenced from other parts of the bank. But unfortunately walls have “holes” often incentivised by vested-interest in profit making by the interest-rate derivatives trading arm of the business. The total market in such derivatives has been estimated at US$554 trillion in 2011. So, even small changes can imply big profits. Indeed, it has been reported that each basis point (0.01%) movement in Libor could reap a net profit of “a couple of million US dollar.”
The lack of transparency in the Libor setting mechanism has tended to exacerbate this urge to cheat. Since the scandal, damning evidence has emerged from probes by regulators in the UK and US, including whistle blowing by employees in a number of banks covering a past period of at least five years. More are likely to emerge from investigations in other nations, including Canada, Japan, EU and Switzerland. The probes cover some of the largest banks, including reportedly Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, UBS, HSBC and Deutsche Bank.
Why Barclays?
Based on what was since disclosed, the Libor scandal has set the stage for lawsuits and demands for more effective regulation the world over. It has led to renewed banker bashing and dented the reputation of the city of London. Barclays, a 300-year old British bank, is in the spotlight simply because it is the first bank to co-operate fully with regulators. It's just the beginning a matter of time before others will be put on the dock. The disclosures and evidence appear damaging. They reveal unacceptable behaviour at Barclays. Two sorts of motivation are discernible.
First, there is manipulation of Libor to trap higher profits in trading. Its traders very brazenly pushed its own money market dealers to manipulate their submissions for fixing Libor, including colluding with counter-parties at other banks. Evidence point to cartel-like association with others to fiddle Libor, with the view to profiteering (or reduce losses) on their derivative exposures. The upshot is that the bank profited from this bad behaviour. Even Bob Diamond, the outgoing Barclays CEO, admitted this doctoring of Libor in favour of the bank's trading positions was “reprehensible.”
Second, there is the rigging of Libor by submitting “lowered” rates at the onset of the credit crunch in 2007 when the authorities were perceived to be keen to bolster confidence in banks (to avoid bailouts) and keep credit flowing; while “higher” (but more realistic) rates submission would be regarded as a sign of its own financial weakness. It would appear in this context as some have argued that a “public good” of sorts was involved. In times of systemic banking crisis, regulators do have a clear motive for wanting a lower Libor. The rationale behind this approach was categorically invalidated by the Bank of England. Like it or not, Barclays has since been fined £290mil (US$450mil) by UK and US regulators for manipulating Libor (£60mil fine by the UK Financial Services Authority is the highest ever imposed even after a 30% discount because it co-operated).
Efforts at reform
Be that as it may, Libor is something of an anachronism, a throwback to a time long past when trust was more important than contract. Concern over Libor goes way back to the early 2008 when reform of the way it is determined was first mooted. BBA's system is akin to an auction. After all, auctions are commonly used to find prices where none exist. It has many variants: from the “English” auction used to sell rare paintings to the on-line auction (as in e-Bay). In the end, every action aims to elicit committed price data from bidders.
As I see it, a more credible Libor fixing system would need four key changes: (i) use of actual lending rates; (ii) outlaw (penalise) false bidding bidders need to be committed to their price; (iii) encourage non-banks also to join in the process to avoid collusion and cartelisation; and (iv) intrusively monitor the process by an outside regulator to ensure tougher oversight.
However, there are many practical challenges to the realisation of a new and improved Libor. Millions of contracts that are Libor-linked may have to be rewritten. This will be difficult and a herculean exercise in the face of lawsuits and ongoing investigations. Critical to well-intentioned reform is the will to change. But with lawsuits and prosecutions gathering pace, the BBA and banking fraternity have little choice but to rework Libor now. As I understand it, because gathering real data can often pose real problems especially at times of financial stress, the most likely solution could be a hybrid. Here, banks would continue to submit estimated cost, but would be required to back them with as many actuals as feasible. To be transparent, they might need to be audited ex-post. Such blending could offer a practical way out.
Like it or not, the global banking industry possibly faces what the Economist has since dubbed as its “tobacco moment,” referring to litigation and settlement that cost the US tobacco industry more than US$200bil in 1988. Sure, actions representing a wide-range of plaintiffs have been launched. But, the legal machinery will grind slowly. Among the claimants are savers in bonds and other instruments linked to Libor (or its equivalent), especially those dealing directly with banks involved in setting the rate. The legal process will prove complicated, where proof of “harm” can get very involved. For the banks face asymmetric risk because they act most of the time as intermediaries those who have “lost” will sue, but banks will be unable to claim from others who “gained.” Much also depends on whether the regulator “press” them to pay compensation; or in the event legal settlements get so large as to require new bailouts (for those too big to fail), to protect them. What a mess.
What, then, are we to do?
Eighty years ago banker JP Morgan jr was reported to have remarked in the midst of the Great Depression: “Since we have not more power of knowing the future than any other men, we have made many mistakes (who has not during the past five years?), but our mistakes have been errors of judgement and not of principle.” Indeed, bankers have since gone overboard and made some serious mistakes, from crimes against time honoured principles to downright fraud. Manipulating Libor is unacceptable. So much so bankers have since lost the public trust. It's about time to rebuild a robust but gentlemanly culture, based on the very best time-tested traditions of banking. They need to start right now.
WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN
Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who speaks, writes and consults on economic and financial issues. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.
Thursday, July 5, 2012
British rivate banks have failed - need a public solution
Private banks have failed – we need a public solution
The Barclays scandal has underlined the City's unmuzzled power. But it also offers a chance to take democratic control
The greatest danger of the rate-fixing scandal now engulfing the City of London is that it will be managed and defused in the usual way, and nothing will really change. Tuesday's forced resignation of Bob Diamond, the Barclays chief executive, follows well-worn procedures for dealing with crises that potentially threaten those in power: denounce the worst offenders, let a few symbolic heads roll, set up an inquiry under a safe pair of hands, and tweak the regulations to prevent a repetition of the most egregious misdemeanours.
That's been the pattern of the past few years as Britain's establishment has lurched from the disaster of the Iraq war to the disgrace of parliamentary expense fiddling and media phone-hacking (though in the case of Iraq, the only heads to roll were BBC executives and an army corporal). As for the banks that triggered the greatest economic crisis for 80 years, they have been bailed out and featherbedded, with only the loss of the odd sacrificial City baron to show for their reckless mayhem.
But we can't afford to allow such political dereliction again. The racket revealed around the rigging of the crucial Libor inter-bank interest rate – affecting $500tn worth of contracts, financial instruments, mortgages and loans – has underlined the scale of corruption at the heart of the financial system. It follows the exposure of the mis-selling of dodgy derivatives and payment protection insurance, voracious tax avoidance and last month's breakdown of the RBS-NatWest basic payments system.
It's already clear that the rate rigging, which depends on collusion, goes far beyond Barclays, and indeed the City of London. This is one of multiple scams that have become endemic in a disastrously deregulated system with inbuilt incentives for cartels to manipulate the core price of finance. Not only that, but the rigging has been public for years – it was first reported in 2008 – and no action has been taken until now.
That echoes the phone-hacking scandal, which erupted eight years after Rebekah Brooks told parliament News International was bribing the police and her admission was entirely ignored. On Tuesday Barclays sought to implicate Whitehall officials in its rate-rigging in 2008, and an angry Diamond, fighting for a payoff of over £20m, can be expected to go further when he appears before the Commons on Wednesday.
As they did with the Murdoch press, politicians who have abased themselves before the financial elite are now denouncing corrupt bankers and each other for failing to bring them to heel. David Cameron, whose party relies on City donors for more than half its income, wants a narrowly Libor-focused parliamentary inquiry to avoid the bigger picture and focus blame on New Labour's enthusiasm for "light touch regulation" in the runup to the crash.
Ed Miliband is rightly pressing for a much broader, Leveson-style public inquiry into the entire banking system. But the reality is that the whole political class embraced deregulated finance in the boom years. While Tony Blair and Gordon Brown pampered the banks, George Osborne and the Conservatives were demanding still less regulation, and even the Liberal Democrat Vince Cable, now the bankers' scourge, endorsed a financial "light touch".
This is yet another disgrace for the country's governing elites. The new revelation of corruption comes after the exposure of the deception of the Iraq war, fraud in parliament and the police, the criminality of a media mafia and the devastating failure of the banks four years ago. It could of course have happened only in a private-dominated financial sector, and makes a nonsense of the bankrupt free-market ideology that still holds sway in public life.
Political and business powerbrokers insist it's all a problem of leadership, bad apples and a culture that has gone awry. But such cultures are generated by structures and systems – and in the case of the City, deregulated short-term profit maximisation has as good as required them. It's certainly necessary to have a clearout of City bosses, prosecutions and wide-ranging inquiries, but only far-reaching change will clear this cesspit.
The financial system has already failed at huge economic and social cost. It has been shown to be corrupt, incompetent, rapacious and economically destructive. The City's claims to be an indispensable jobs and tax engine for the British economy are nonsense: the bailout costs of 2008-9 dwarfed the financial tax revenues of the boom years, which were below those of manufacturing even at their peak.
In fact, the banks are pumped up with state subsidies and liquidity that they are still failing to pass on in productive lending five years into the crisis. A crucial part of the explanation is the unmuzzled political and economic power of the City: its colonisation of Whitehall and public life, effective grip on its own regulation, revolving-door pull on politicians and civil servants, and purchase of political parties. Finance has usurped democracy.
The crash of 2008 offered a huge opportunity to break that grip and reform the financial system. It was lost. The system was left as good as intact, and even the part-nationalised banks, RBS and Lloyds, have since been run at arm's length to fatten them up as quickly as possible for re-privatisation (savage RBS cost-cutting lies behind its humiliating performance last month), instead of as motors of investment and recovery.
The rate-rigging scandal now offers a second opportunity to build the pressure for fundamental change. That's hard to imagine being carried out by a coalition dominated by the City-funded Tories, but Labour has also yet to break fully with its pre-crisis economic model.
Tougher regulation or even a full separation of retail from investment banking will not be enough to shift the City into productive investment, or even prevent the kind of corrupt collusion that has now been exposed between Barclays and other banks. As a report by Manchester University's Cresc research team argues this week, the size and complexity of the modern banking system makes it "near ungovernable".
Only if the largest banks are broken up, the part-nationalised outfits turned into genuine public investment banks, and new socially owned and regional banks encouraged can finance be made to work for society, rather than the other way round. Private sector banking has spectacularly failed – and we need a democratic public solution.
• This article was amended on 4 July 2012. The original misspelled Rebekah Brooks's name as Rebecca. This has been corrected.
Monday, July 2, 2012
After Barclays, the golden age of finance is dead
Retribution and regulation are sure to follow the Barclays scandal, but if the
City is shackled, Britain as a whole will suffer
Just when you thought bankers could sink no lower in public regard, they’ve
done it. News that Barclays has been found guilty of repeatedly falsifying
the interbank rate – sometimes for the personal gain of traders, sometimes
to make the bank itself seem more creditworthy than it really was – tops off
another calamitous week in the seemingly never-ending litany of banking
misdemeanours.
Coming hard on the heels of the chaos surrounding an IT breakdown at Royal Bank of Scotland, it is as if bankers are actively out to confirm their reputation for recklessness, incompetence and self-enriching disregard for the interests of customers and the wider economy.
At a time when the political and regulatory backlash against finance is already at fever pitch, much of it ill-thought out, counterproductive and economically harmful, there could scarcely have been a more spectacular own goal. And it doesn’t end there. Banking faces a whole new raft of separate regulatory strictures over the mis-selling of interest rate swaps to business customers.
A year ago, Bob Diamond, chief executive of Barclays, told a committee of MPs that it was time to put the crisis behind us, move on and stop apologising for the failings of the past. He should be so lucky. Not since the Thirties has finance been so much in the dock. On and on the combination of retribution and regulatory crackdown will go until banking is once again thought sufficiently imprisoned to be safe. European policymakers will delight in the ammunition they have been given to rein in the Anglo-Saxon bankers and make them subject to the rule of Brussels and Frankfurt.
Many have already said it, but it is one of those observations that bears constant repetition: in all my years as a financial journalist, it’s hard to recall a case quite as shameful as this – and I’ve certainly seen a few.
Coming hard on the heels of the chaos surrounding an IT breakdown at Royal Bank of Scotland, it is as if bankers are actively out to confirm their reputation for recklessness, incompetence and self-enriching disregard for the interests of customers and the wider economy.
At a time when the political and regulatory backlash against finance is already at fever pitch, much of it ill-thought out, counterproductive and economically harmful, there could scarcely have been a more spectacular own goal. And it doesn’t end there. Banking faces a whole new raft of separate regulatory strictures over the mis-selling of interest rate swaps to business customers.
A year ago, Bob Diamond, chief executive of Barclays, told a committee of MPs that it was time to put the crisis behind us, move on and stop apologising for the failings of the past. He should be so lucky. Not since the Thirties has finance been so much in the dock. On and on the combination of retribution and regulatory crackdown will go until banking is once again thought sufficiently imprisoned to be safe. European policymakers will delight in the ammunition they have been given to rein in the Anglo-Saxon bankers and make them subject to the rule of Brussels and Frankfurt.
Many have already said it, but it is one of those observations that bears constant repetition: in all my years as a financial journalist, it’s hard to recall a case quite as shameful as this – and I’ve certainly seen a few.
There is no industry in all commerce that relies as much on public trust and
reputation for probity as banking. We have seen what happens when trust is
lost: we get the legion of banking runs that lie at the heart of the
financial crisis; people run for the hills and the economy grinds to a halt.
To have American regulators accuse Barclays of lies, deception and manipulation is an appalling indictment of one of the oldest and most respected names in British banking. It is like discovering that your local branch manager has routinely raided your hard-earned savings to finance his champagne lifestyle.
Entrusted with the public’s money, bankers have to be seen as whiter than white, pillars of their community and morally beyond reproach. All these old-fashioned virtues seem to have been lost in pursuit of the easy rewards of international finance. “My word is my bond” – once one of the sacred principles of City finance – has become reduced to a laughable parody of itself.
Now, it may well be unfair to single out Barclays. We already know that at least 20 other banks are under investigation for alleged manipulation of interbank interest rates, including most of the other UK high street banks. It could be that others are equally at fault. We know about Barclays only because in a practice that City lawyers sometimes call “rowing for the shore”, it has decided to abandon the flotilla of co-defendants and settle with regulators.
Downside of plea bargain
In so doing, it may have succeeded in winning both a lower fine and immunity from criminal prosecution, as a corporate entity at least, though the individuals involved may not escape. The downside of such plea bargains is that they involve admission of guilt. The regulator gets free rein to be as critical as it likes, while the mitigation of any defence there might have been is lost.
That these practices appear to have been endemic, not just at Barclays, but across a wide range of international banks, neither excuses nor explains what happened.
It’s interesting that when the fines were first announced on Wednesday, there was barely a flicker of recognition in the Barclays share price. The investigation has been known about for some time, the misdeeds complained of date back three or more years and are therefore water under the bridge, and many in the City judged Barclays to have got off relatively lightly.
But as the night wore on, the seriousness of the situation began to sink in. Bob Diamond, the Barclays chief executive, long despised by regulators found himself politically friendless, too.
As calls for his head mounted, the share price began to plunge. The key concern about Barclays has always been that it is a “black box” operation that only Bob himself properly understands. At a time of growing financial chaos, Barclays could be left leaderless, with the investment banking brains behind much of its recent profitability and successful navigation of the banking crisis thrown to the wolves.
“Bob is mistrusted in the City,” says one seasoned fund manager, “but he’s the glue that holds the whole thing together. Without him it might well disintegrate.”
What went wrong?
So what really went wrong here? The London Interbank Offered Rate, or Libor, and its companion, Euribor, are two of the most important benchmarks in finance. Essentially, they are an aggregate of the rates at which banks lend to one another. They are also used to help price a vast array of lending decisions and derivative products, including mortgages.
Yet even in financial markets, it is not widely understood how these benchmarks are arrived at. Unbeknown to senior managers at Barclays, some traders, starting in around 2005 and stretching through to 2009, began persuading those responsible for compiling Barclays’ input to distort the rate in a manner that made their own derivative positions more profitable, hence the excruciating series of incriminating emails cited by regulators.
This was bad enough, but if it had stopped there, the damage would probably have been containable. Even the best of internal controls cannot prevent the determined rotten apple. What has transformed this case into something much more serious is that at the height of the banking crisis “senior managers” themselves – it is still not clear exactly who – ordered that the Barclays submission be manipulated so as to make it look as if the bank was receiving more favourable funding terms than it was. Deceitful behaviour seemed to have become endemic, stretching from top to bottom.
To the extent that there is a defence for such blatant deceits, it runs something like this; everyone else was doing the same thing. Rival banks that were plainly in even worse shape than Barclays were making Libor submissions that appeared to show they were enjoying more favourable wholesale funding rates than Barclays was. On the “if you cannot beat them” principle, Barclays determined to join them.
If this version of events is correct, the whole escapade doesn’t look as bad as it first appears. It is hard to identify who exactly lost out as a result of these fictions. Since there was no interbank funding to speak of at the height of the crisis, it may not in any case have mattered very much.
Even so, it’s quite damning enough. There appears to be nothing bankers will stop at in order to feather their own nests. With tempers already at boiling point over egregious levels of pay and aggressive tax avoidance, the whole affair has now taken on a life of its own.
When the history books are written, this may be seen as a defining moment, the point at which public anger with the banks bubbled over into something much more seismic in its consequences than the general atmosphere of bank bashing we have seen to date. Despite the crisis, there has been a sense of back to business as normal for the City these past three years.
There have been few signs of behavioural change. But this may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.
Market and regulatory pressures are already laying waste to great tracts of previously highly lucrative banking activity. A major cull of investment banking jobs is expected over the next year, with once bumper bonuses and earnings much reduced on top. Retribution and punishingly restrictive levels of regulation won’t be far behind.
Those who believe that Britain has become too dependent on finance for its own good will no doubt welcome this humbling of an apparently out-of-control City, but they should be careful what they wish for.
Finance’s golden age may be drawing to a close; with no new industry or manufacturing renaissance coming up in the wings, it is not entirely clear what’s going to take its place as a source of British wealth, jobs and tax revenues. It is not just finance for which hard times lie ahead. - Telegraph
To have American regulators accuse Barclays of lies, deception and manipulation is an appalling indictment of one of the oldest and most respected names in British banking. It is like discovering that your local branch manager has routinely raided your hard-earned savings to finance his champagne lifestyle.
Entrusted with the public’s money, bankers have to be seen as whiter than white, pillars of their community and morally beyond reproach. All these old-fashioned virtues seem to have been lost in pursuit of the easy rewards of international finance. “My word is my bond” – once one of the sacred principles of City finance – has become reduced to a laughable parody of itself.
Now, it may well be unfair to single out Barclays. We already know that at least 20 other banks are under investigation for alleged manipulation of interbank interest rates, including most of the other UK high street banks. It could be that others are equally at fault. We know about Barclays only because in a practice that City lawyers sometimes call “rowing for the shore”, it has decided to abandon the flotilla of co-defendants and settle with regulators.
Downside of plea bargain
In so doing, it may have succeeded in winning both a lower fine and immunity from criminal prosecution, as a corporate entity at least, though the individuals involved may not escape. The downside of such plea bargains is that they involve admission of guilt. The regulator gets free rein to be as critical as it likes, while the mitigation of any defence there might have been is lost.
That these practices appear to have been endemic, not just at Barclays, but across a wide range of international banks, neither excuses nor explains what happened.
It’s interesting that when the fines were first announced on Wednesday, there was barely a flicker of recognition in the Barclays share price. The investigation has been known about for some time, the misdeeds complained of date back three or more years and are therefore water under the bridge, and many in the City judged Barclays to have got off relatively lightly.
But as the night wore on, the seriousness of the situation began to sink in. Bob Diamond, the Barclays chief executive, long despised by regulators found himself politically friendless, too.
As calls for his head mounted, the share price began to plunge. The key concern about Barclays has always been that it is a “black box” operation that only Bob himself properly understands. At a time of growing financial chaos, Barclays could be left leaderless, with the investment banking brains behind much of its recent profitability and successful navigation of the banking crisis thrown to the wolves.
“Bob is mistrusted in the City,” says one seasoned fund manager, “but he’s the glue that holds the whole thing together. Without him it might well disintegrate.”
What went wrong?
So what really went wrong here? The London Interbank Offered Rate, or Libor, and its companion, Euribor, are two of the most important benchmarks in finance. Essentially, they are an aggregate of the rates at which banks lend to one another. They are also used to help price a vast array of lending decisions and derivative products, including mortgages.
Yet even in financial markets, it is not widely understood how these benchmarks are arrived at. Unbeknown to senior managers at Barclays, some traders, starting in around 2005 and stretching through to 2009, began persuading those responsible for compiling Barclays’ input to distort the rate in a manner that made their own derivative positions more profitable, hence the excruciating series of incriminating emails cited by regulators.
This was bad enough, but if it had stopped there, the damage would probably have been containable. Even the best of internal controls cannot prevent the determined rotten apple. What has transformed this case into something much more serious is that at the height of the banking crisis “senior managers” themselves – it is still not clear exactly who – ordered that the Barclays submission be manipulated so as to make it look as if the bank was receiving more favourable funding terms than it was. Deceitful behaviour seemed to have become endemic, stretching from top to bottom.
To the extent that there is a defence for such blatant deceits, it runs something like this; everyone else was doing the same thing. Rival banks that were plainly in even worse shape than Barclays were making Libor submissions that appeared to show they were enjoying more favourable wholesale funding rates than Barclays was. On the “if you cannot beat them” principle, Barclays determined to join them.
If this version of events is correct, the whole escapade doesn’t look as bad as it first appears. It is hard to identify who exactly lost out as a result of these fictions. Since there was no interbank funding to speak of at the height of the crisis, it may not in any case have mattered very much.
Even so, it’s quite damning enough. There appears to be nothing bankers will stop at in order to feather their own nests. With tempers already at boiling point over egregious levels of pay and aggressive tax avoidance, the whole affair has now taken on a life of its own.
When the history books are written, this may be seen as a defining moment, the point at which public anger with the banks bubbled over into something much more seismic in its consequences than the general atmosphere of bank bashing we have seen to date. Despite the crisis, there has been a sense of back to business as normal for the City these past three years.
There have been few signs of behavioural change. But this may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.
Market and regulatory pressures are already laying waste to great tracts of previously highly lucrative banking activity. A major cull of investment banking jobs is expected over the next year, with once bumper bonuses and earnings much reduced on top. Retribution and punishingly restrictive levels of regulation won’t be far behind.
Those who believe that Britain has become too dependent on finance for its own good will no doubt welcome this humbling of an apparently out-of-control City, but they should be careful what they wish for.
Finance’s golden age may be drawing to a close; with no new industry or manufacturing renaissance coming up in the wings, it is not entirely clear what’s going to take its place as a source of British wealth, jobs and tax revenues. It is not just finance for which hard times lie ahead. - Telegraph
Saturday, June 30, 2012
Four British banks to pay for scandal!
LONDON: Britain's four biggest banks have agreed to pay compensation
to customers they misled about interest rate hedging products, following
an investigation by Britain's financial regulator.
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) said yesterday it had reached an agreement with Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and RBS to provide appropriate compensation following an investigation into the misselling of the products.
The FSA said it found evidence of “serious failings” by the banks and added: “We believe that this has resulted in a severe impact on a large number of these businesses.”
The finding by the FSA of misselling could lead to compensation claims ranging from many millions to several billion pounds from small companies which bought them.
It is the latest in a string of misselling cases that have plagued the financial services industry for over two decades. Banks are already set to pay upwards of £9bil (US$13.96bil) in compensation to customers for misselling loan insurance.
The news will compound problems for a sector that was hit hard on Thursday by news of a record US$450mil fine levied on Barclays for rigging interest rates.
The FSA said the banks had agreed to compensate directly those customers that brought the most complex products.
The products range in complexity from caps that fix an upper limit to the interest rate on a loan, through to complex derivatives known as “structured collars” which fixed interest rates with a bank but introduced a degree of interest rate speculation.
The banks have agreed to stop marketing “structured collars” to retail customers.
The size of the likely compensation was not disclosed but Lloyds issued a separate statement saying it did not expect the financial impact from the settlement to be material. - Reuters
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) said yesterday it had reached an agreement with Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and RBS to provide appropriate compensation following an investigation into the misselling of the products.
The FSA said it found evidence of “serious failings” by the banks and added: “We believe that this has resulted in a severe impact on a large number of these businesses.”
The finding by the FSA of misselling could lead to compensation claims ranging from many millions to several billion pounds from small companies which bought them.
It is the latest in a string of misselling cases that have plagued the financial services industry for over two decades. Banks are already set to pay upwards of £9bil (US$13.96bil) in compensation to customers for misselling loan insurance.
The news will compound problems for a sector that was hit hard on Thursday by news of a record US$450mil fine levied on Barclays for rigging interest rates.
The FSA said the banks had agreed to compensate directly those customers that brought the most complex products.
The products range in complexity from caps that fix an upper limit to the interest rate on a loan, through to complex derivatives known as “structured collars” which fixed interest rates with a bank but introduced a degree of interest rate speculation.
The banks have agreed to stop marketing “structured collars” to retail customers.
The size of the likely compensation was not disclosed but Lloyds issued a separate statement saying it did not expect the financial impact from the settlement to be material. - Reuters
Friday, June 22, 2012
Moody's downgrades 15 major banks: Citigroup, HSBC ...
Citigroup and HSBC were among the banks downgraded
The credit ratings agency Moody's has downgraded 15 banks and financial institutions.
UK banks downgraded include Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays and HSBC.
In the US, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan are among those marked down.
BBC business editor Robert Peston reported on Tuesday that the downgrades were coming and said that banks were concerned as it may make it harder for them to borrow money commercially.
"All of the banks affected by today's actions have significant exposure to the volatility and risk of outsized losses inherent to capital markets activities," Moody's global banking managing director Greg Bauer said in the agency's statement.
The other institutions that have been downgraded are Credit Suisse, UBS, BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, Societe Generale, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Canada and Morgan Stanley.
Moody's said it recognised, "the clear intent of governments around the world to reduce support for creditors", but added that they had not yet put the frameworks in place that would allow them to let banks fail.
Some of the banks were put on negative outlook, which is a warning that they could be downgraded again later, on the basis that governments may eventually manage to withdraw their support.
“Start Quote
The most interesting thing about the Moody's analysis is that it, in effect, creates three new categories of global banks, the banking equivalent of the Premier League, the Championship and League One”
Robert Peston Business editor
In a statement, RBS responded to
its downgrade saying: "The group disagrees with Moody's ratings change
which the group feels is backward-looking and does not give adequate
credit for the substantial improvements the group has made to its
balance sheet, funding and risk profile."
Of the banks downgraded, four were cut by one notch on Moody's ranking scale, 10 by two notches and one, Credit Suisse, by three notches.
"The biggest surprise is the three-notch downgrade of Credit Suisse, which no one was looking for," said Mark Grant, managing director of Southwest Securities.
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Related:
FDIC: Failed Bank List
Monday, August 22, 2011
Layoffs sweep Wall Street, along with low morale
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By Lauren Tara LaCapra NEW YORK
(Reuters) - In early summer, before layoffs began sweeping across Wall Street, billboard-sized photos of employees were plastered on the walls, pillars and elevator banks of Credit Suisse Group AG's offices in the United States and abroad.
The museum-quality prints, depicting workers from administrative assistants to senior executives, were emblazoned with motivational words like "Proactive" and "Partner." By mid-July, however, the photos disappeared and the Swiss banking giant began laying off 2,000 employees.
Security guards prevented employees from taking cell-phone pictures as the posters were stripped away, according to one employee who was present.
"It sent an entirely wrong message," said an employee, who was not authorized to speak publicly. "Management literally threw away that kind of money on something so trivial, while planning to cut thousands of jobs."
A bank spokeswoman declined to comment on the internal campaign or the employee's comments.
Credit Suisse's timing illustrates the unanticipated dangers of rampant job-cutting, which tend to run in cycles on Wall Street. Employee morale often plummets at a time when survivors are asked to pick up more responsibility and customer relations can suffer as service and relationships deteriorate.
CUTTING 'MUSCLE AND BONE'
What's more, layoffs inartfully constructed can come across to shareholders as Band-Aid solutions that at best temporarily cut expenses and at worst pare away reserves of talented people.
"They finished cutting the fat and now they're into the muscle and bone," said Tim White, a managing partner who specializes in wealth management at the recruiting firm Kaye/Bassman International in Dallas.
Credit Suisse has plenty of company in its cost-cutting campaign. HSBC, Barclays PLC, Goldman Sachs Group Inc and Bank of New York Mellon Corp have announced plans to ax thousands of workers in recent months. On Thursday, Bank of America Corp Chief Executive Brian Moynihan sent a memo to senior executives outlining plans to cut another 3,500 jobs.
The planned cuts at Bank of America have pushed the number of financial sector layoffs this year to 18,252 -- 6 percent higher than in the comparable period in 2010, according to Challenger, Gray & Christmas, an outplacement firm that keeps a daily tab on layoff announcements.
Some companies began the culling earlier this year -- HSBC has already axed about 5,000 employees, with 25,000 more set to get pink slips by the end of 2012 -- and others, such as Goldman Sachs, said that cuts will come by year's end.
That is not good for morale.
BITING INTO CLIENT SERVICE
Hours have become longer, trading floors have more open seats and fresh young faces are taking over offices where high-level personnel once sat. The highest-paid people can be easy targets for layoffs now, given the cost of keeping them employed and the eagerness of younger workers to take on their roles, even at less pay, executive recruiters said.
Changes in pay structures mandated in part by the Dodd-Frank financial reform laws have exacerbated the problem.
Banks that used to pay modest base salaries supplemented by opulent stock-and-option packages that encouraged meeting short-term performance goals now are weighting compensation toward base salary.
Managing directors at investment banks have seen a typical base salary double to $400,000, said Paul Sorbera, president of Alliance Consulting. Meanwhile, 2011 bonuses are expected to fall by up to 30 percent for top earners, according to pay consulting firm Johnson Associates.
The shift erodes Wall Street's former flexibility to lower end-of-year bonuses in bad times and forces a heavier reliance on layoffs.
The danger is that client service suffers.
"Banking clients abhor relationship-manager turnover," said Heather Hammond, a senior member of Russell Reynolds' financial services practice.
Investors, for their part, tend to view cost-cutting as a short-term solution that fails to address fundamental issues relating to capital, strategy and the ability to endure through hard economic times.
At Credit Suisse, some senior jobs have been consolidated as executives have been escorted toward early retirement with offers of bonus bridges and other payments, sources familiar with the matter say.
Managing directors in businesses that have missed revenue targets have been told to reduce millions of dollars' worth of headcount expenses, according to a managing director who received such a request. In some areas, including operations, legal and technology, more work is being outsourced and mid-level employees are being replaced by consultants.
"People are leaving resumes on the printers, hoping someone picks it up," the Credit Suisse employee said.
Some sources believe that banks are repeating their typical hiring strategy: Cutting staff levels too deeply in bad times only to rush out with open checkbooks when markets recover.
"When people are getting hired, fired, hired, fired, every two years, it's very difficult to run a business," said Conrad Ciccotello, a finance professor at Georgia State University who has studied the issue. "There is precious human capital destroyed in vicious boom-and-bust cycles that is costly to replace."
(Reporting by Lauren Tara LaCapra; Editing by Richard Chang and Jan paschal)
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Wednesday, August 3, 2011
Barclays, HSBC, BoA among big European, US Banks Job Cuts, Hard Hit !
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Barclays job cuts take Europe’s tally to 40,000
Swiss firms hit by impact of soaring franc
LONDON (MarketWatch) — A running tally of planned job cuts by European banks reached around 40,000 Tuesday, little more than halfway though earnings season, as firms that failed to control costs or were over-optimistic about growth make the deepest cuts.
Barclays PLC UK:BARC -0.12% BCS -0.84% was the latest to confirm job losses Tuesday, saying it’s already cut 1,400 jobs and indicating the figure could rise to around 3,000 by the end of the year.
The announcement came as the bank reported a 38% drop in net profit to 1.5 billion pounds ($2.45 billion), partly due to compensation it’s paying to customers who were sold inappropriate insurance.
The Barclays cuts take the total announced by banks reporting in the last week to 35,000. On top of that, UBS AG CH:UBSN -7.70% UBS -4.68% also confirmed it would slash jobs, with media reports in Switzerland pegging the number of losses at around 5,000.
The total doesn’t include a further 15,000 job cuts announced by Lloyds Banking Group PLC UK:LLOY -3.02% LYG -4.46% at the end of June.
Barclays PLC UK:BARC -0.12% BCS -0.84% was the latest to confirm job losses Tuesday, saying it’s already cut 1,400 jobs and indicating the figure could rise to around 3,000 by the end of the year.
Citibank Executive on U.S. debt deal
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, Michael Zink, Citibank's country officer in Singapore, discusses the implications of the U.S. debt-ceiling deal for global markets and the dollar.The announcement came as the bank reported a 38% drop in net profit to 1.5 billion pounds ($2.45 billion), partly due to compensation it’s paying to customers who were sold inappropriate insurance.
The Barclays cuts take the total announced by banks reporting in the last week to 35,000. On top of that, UBS AG CH:UBSN -7.70% UBS -4.68% also confirmed it would slash jobs, with media reports in Switzerland pegging the number of losses at around 5,000.
The total doesn’t include a further 15,000 job cuts announced by Lloyds Banking Group PLC UK:LLOY -3.02% LYG -4.46% at the end of June.
Strong franc hurting Swiss banks
UBS and Credit Suisse CH:CSGN -7.77% CS -4.16% , which is cutting around 2,000 jobs, are facing an uphill battle against the soaring Swiss franc because they have such a big cost base in Switzerland, but receive a lot of their revenue in dollars and euros.
On top of that UBS CEO Oswald Gruebel made a significant effort to rebuild the firm’s fixed-income trading business in the wake of the crisis, but is now cutting back in areas where it’s not making money, said Christopher Wheeler, an analyst at Mediobanca.
“Ozzie is a trader and he’s taking a trader's view by cutting his positions,” said Wheeler.
HSBC Holdings PLC UK:HSBA +0.43% HBC -0.20% will cut around 30,000 positions by 2013, reflecting the fact that the bank “massively over-expanded in retail banking,” Wheeler added.
Soaring costs at HSBC have been a significant worry for investors for some time, leading the bank to announce in May that it will withdraw from markets where it can’t achieve the right scale. Read more on HSBC's cost-cutting plans.
On top of that UBS CEO Oswald Gruebel made a significant effort to rebuild the firm’s fixed-income trading business in the wake of the crisis, but is now cutting back in areas where it’s not making money, said Christopher Wheeler, an analyst at Mediobanca.
“Ozzie is a trader and he’s taking a trader's view by cutting his positions,” said Wheeler.
HSBC Holdings PLC UK:HSBA +0.43% HBC -0.20% will cut around 30,000 positions by 2013, reflecting the fact that the bank “massively over-expanded in retail banking,” Wheeler added.
Soaring costs at HSBC have been a significant worry for investors for some time, leading the bank to announce in May that it will withdraw from markets where it can’t achieve the right scale. Read more on HSBC's cost-cutting plans.
Societe Generale analyst James Invine said in a note to clients that costs are still “a mountain to climb” for HSBC and that much of the growth is due to wage inflation in its faster-growing markets.
“That is a cost about which it can do very little, particularly given Asia’s strategic importance for the group,” Invine said.
The Barclays cuts are a mix of trimming a bloated looking corporate banking arm and slimming down European retail banking, as well as trimming its Barclays Capital investment banking arm after some pretty aggressive expansion, said Wheeler.
Barclays was the bank that snapped up the U.S. operations of Lehman Brothers Holdings, including around 10,000 staff, after the U.S. firm collapsed in 2008.
“In bull markets, you can hide a lot,” he said.
“But when you get into these sort of markets you have to address it, because, it sticks out like a sore thumb.”
Simon Kennedy is the City correspondent for MarketWatch in London.
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“That is a cost about which it can do very little, particularly given Asia’s strategic importance for the group,” Invine said.
The Barclays cuts are a mix of trimming a bloated looking corporate banking arm and slimming down European retail banking, as well as trimming its Barclays Capital investment banking arm after some pretty aggressive expansion, said Wheeler.
Barclays was the bank that snapped up the U.S. operations of Lehman Brothers Holdings, including around 10,000 staff, after the U.S. firm collapsed in 2008.
“In bull markets, you can hide a lot,” he said.
“But when you get into these sort of markets you have to address it, because, it sticks out like a sore thumb.”
Simon Kennedy is the City correspondent for MarketWatch in London.
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HSBC may cut 10,000 jobs
HONG KONG: HSBC Plc may cut more than 10,000 jobs as it embarks on a cost-cutting drive, Sky News reported, citing people close to Europe's biggest bank.The bank's plans had not yet been finalised, Sky News added, citing an insider at the bank
A HSBC spokeswoman in Hong Kong declined to comment.
HSBC's move would be the latest in a wave of cuts announced by the global financial industry, which has been hit by market volatility and lacklustre profits.
Just yesterday, Swiss bank Credit Suisse announced it would cut about 2,000 jobs after a second quarter hit by weak trading activity and the strong Swiss franc.
Switzerland's second biggest bank saw net profit fell 52% to 768 million Swiss francs (US$958.9mil), it said on Thursday.
Standard Chartered, Lloyds, Goldman Sachs and UBS are among banks that have announced job cuts in recent months, hit by rising costs and weak revenue growth.
State Street Corp, one of the world's biggest institutional investors, said earlier this month it would eliminate as many 850 jobs from its technology unit as it tried to curb costs.
HSBC has about 330,000 employees worldwide.
The Sky report came after it said in May it was looking for sustainable cost savings of US$2.5bil to US$3.5bil in order to reach a cost efficiency ratio target of 48%-52% by 2013.
It also said it would be conducting a strategic review of its cards business in the United States, and would limit its retail banking operations to markets where it could achieve profitable scale.
It already cut 700 jobs in its UK retail banking arm in June this year out of its staff of 55,000 in the country, one of many banks that have said they will cull jobs to save costs as lenders fight off a limp economic recovery.
HSBC shares in Hong Kong were down 1.1% by noon yesterday, in line with the broader market's 1% decline. - Reuters
Big Banks Hit Hard In Market Sell-Off
Big U.S. and European banks were hit hard in Thursday’s stock sell-off, highlighting investor concerns about some of the more prominent financial institutions.In the U.S., Bank of America’s stock fell by 7.44% and has now tumbled by 33% this year. Bank of America’s chief executive, Brian Moynihan, will now really have his work cut out for him next week when he plans to take questions on a public call hosted by Bruce Berkowitz, the rock star hedge fund manager who has taken a big and controversial position in the nation’s biggest bank.
The KBW Bank Index fell by 5.3%, but some of the biggest banks in the U.S. fell more, like Citigroup, which fell by 6.6%. Big banks like Citigroup are struggling to deal with surging litigation costs stemming from the credit crisis while also dealing with more stringent capital standards.
The situation in Europe is worse, where investors are starting to wonder more and more about the Italian government securities being held by the large European banks, not to mention IOUs from the other countries like Spain. Italy is really getting more mired in the euro crisis and UniCredit shares tumbled by more than 9% on Thursday. Lloyds Banking Group has now seen its shares lose nearly half their value in 2011.
The decline in bank stocks could add momentum to the job cuts already being implemented on Wall Street and the banking sector. HSBC recently said it would slice 30,000 jobs. It will also potentially weigh on the economic recovery. But at least some banks are making the best of an ominous situation. Bank of New York Mellon said on Thursday it will start to charge clients fleeing to safety a fee for extraordinarily high deposits.
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