The Communist Party of China (CPC) has to acknowledge the market's 
decisive role in allocating resources as it is proven to be the most 
effective, said President 
Xi Jinping when explaining a key document about reforms.
China
 will deepen its economic reform to ensure that the market will play a 
"decisive" role in allocating resources, according to a decision on 
major issues concerning comprehensively deepening reforms, approved by 
the 
Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee on November 12.
Entrusted
 by the Political Bureau of CPC Central Committee, Xi, also general 
secretary of CPC Central Committee, explained the decision at the 
session. His explanation was published in full on Friday.
Xi considered the definition of the market's role a major theoretical achievement of the decision.
A proper relationship between the market and government remains the core of China's economic reform, Xi said.
To
 build such a relationship is to settle whether the market or government
 plays a decisive role, he said, adding that the market is proven to be 
the most effective.
Over the past some 20 years, China has established a socialist market economy but there are lots of problems, Xi admitted.
The
 market is not orderly and many seek profits through illegal means. The 
market for key production factors, such as labor, capital and land, are 
lagging behind, he said.
Market rules are not unified and there 
are prevailing departmental and regional protectionism, he warned, 
adding that a lack of full competition stops the inferior from being 
eliminated.
China has to follow the basic law of the market 
economy and work on the problems of an underdeveloped market system, 
excessive government intervention and weak supervision of the market, he
 said.
Accepting the market's decisive role will help the Party 
and society develop a correct idea about market-government relations, 
help the country transform the economic growth pattern, help the 
government change its functions and help curb corruption, he said.
However, Xi noted that to let the market decide does not mean to let it decide all.
"The socialist market economy needs both the market and government but they play different roles," he said.
The
 government will maintain a stable macro-economy, provide public 
services, safeguard fair competition, supervise the market, keep market 
order, promote sustainable development and step in when the market 
fails, he said.
The market had been defined as a "basic" role in 
allocating resources since the country decided to build a socialist 
market economy in 1992.
For a long period of time after 1949, the idea of market had been a taboo associated with capitalism.
Even after the reform and opening up in 1978, the country had
struggled to define the market and some dogmatists still questioned whether socialism could accommodate the market economy.
It was not until the 14th CPC National Congress held in 1992 that a socialist market economy became a consensus.
At
 the 15th CPC National Congress in 1997, the Party noted that the 
market, under state macroeconomic control, should be the basic means of 
allocating resources.
At the 16th CPC National Congress in 2002, 
the Party said it should leverage to a greater extent the basic role of 
the market in allocating resources.
At the 17th CPC National 
Congress in 2007, the Party decided that it should introduce 
institutions to give better play to the basic role of market forces in 
allocating resources.
At the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, 
the Party said it should leverage to a greater extent and in a wider 
scope the basic role of the market in allocating resources.
"Now,
 the CPC Central Committee believes that the condition is ready to bring
 up a new theoretical expression of this issue," Xi said. - Xinhua
China stays on road to reform 
Staying on course: A souvenir with an image of President Xi Jinping (left) and the late leader Mao Zedong on sale at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, during the meeting of the Central Committee of China’s ruling Communist Party, at which major reforms were discussed. — EPA
THE business of China-watching intensified lately for the Third 
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China.
This was a special occasion in also doubling as the first 
anniversary of President Xi Jinping’s leadership of the party and of 
China’s Central Military Commission.
It is a measure of China’s rising global status that such domestic 
occasions should attract serious worldwide attention. The same does not 
apply for other countries.
Some analysts believe that the world’s second-biggest economy will, 
by the end of Xi’s term in a decade, become the world’s biggest – and 
continue to outpace the US and other economies thereafter.
Since economics remains the prime determinant of a nation’s various 
attributes, China’s economic achievements are closely watched because 
they indicate its prowess in other spheres as well.
For this particular occasion, there is another reason for Beijing as
 the world’s centre of attention – Third Plenums are traditionally the 
stamping ground for new priorities and directions. That it coincides 
with a new leadership makes for a packed global gallery.
Speculation about Xi’s leadership peaked in the lead-up to this 
occasion. Opinion was divided over whether China would lean towards 
reform and further opening up, or veer towards Maoist conservatism.
Xi’s personal style was no help to the betting classes. In keeping 
his cards close to his chest, he was not one to telegraph his intentions
 and preferences ahead of time.
Then there was the complication of the Bo Xilai affair. The fall of 
the former rising star was said to be a sideshow obscuring internal 
party politicking.
Bo’s supporters tended to look past his controversial hardline 
tactics, corruption allegations, his wife’s involvement in murder and 
his Maoist-inspired opposition to Beijing’s reforms. In his defence, 
they instead questioned Xi’s commitment to reform.
However, any antipathy Beijing had to Bo would also be averse to a 
Maoist resurgence and therefore be pro-reform. There was also no 
question of Xi’s priority in targeting corruption and promoting the rule
 of law.
Nonetheless, for many the doubts about China’s leadership direction 
persisted. And the question would be settled by the Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th Central Committee.
Now those who were never in any doubt about Xi’s reform drive feel 
vindicated. Fence-sitters are also more convinced than ever that Xi and 
Prime Minister Li Keqiang will take China further along the road of 
reform.
Doubters are now puzzling over the general nature of official public
 statements from the plenum. They are stumped by an apparent shortage of
 specifics.
However, generalities indicate only a lack of details, not a 
reversal of direction. And given the presence of conservatives like Bo 
still in the party hierarchy, reformist leaders would do well to avoid 
advertising their plans to prevent obstruction and sabotage.
Xi is certainly not one to telegraph his intentions and preferences 
ahead of time. Former Singapore premier Lee Kuan Yew has observed that 
Xi is not demonstrative while still retaining his affable style.
Besides, Third Plenums of the 21st century have also been less 
hortatory and more cool and businesslike. A modern China headed by state
 functionaries rather than ideological patriarchs is where the Xis and 
Lis are at.
Over the long term, it has been a process of evolution for China’s 
leadership. In comparisons between Xi-Li and their immediate 
predecessors Hu-Wen, Xi is said to be more open and approachable.
Xi and Li are also regarded as more purposeful and cosmopolitan, a 
style that matches the contemporary demeanour of their international 
counterparts. And style still accounts for much, notwithstanding the 
weight of official policies and procedures.
Several views from Hong Kong, as expressed through the 
South China Morning Post
 newspaper for example, regard Xi’s leadership as clearly Dengist rather
 than Maoist. That effectively reaffirms the reformist road.
To that extent, this Third Plenum produced no surprises. Continuity 
and consistency are key to China’s development, and Xi is tasked with 
ensuring that trajectory in particular.
The polar opposites of Mao and Deng remain a bifurcation – and an 
ironic one at that. Their differences are strategic and ultimately 
ideological rather than personal.
Deng the Establishment rebel, the last Long March veteran, the final
 Paramount Leader and the Other Helmsman who turned China around is 
still deeply revered, including by the younger generation.
Young professionals and bureaucrats in their 30s, whether in 
official Beijing, bustling Shanghai or rural Hubei province today have 
no hesitation to say they are Dengist. They do not denigrate Mao, not 
even for his excesses and horrors, they just admire his party alter ego.
This is the political status quo of China today. It should therefore
 be no surprise that the party and state machinery, in carefully 
reviewing and sifting through contending candidates, has produced 
leaders that exemplify this bearing.
Thus Xi is no closet Maoist for prescribing self-criticism and 
attempts at censorship. Some tactics may appear conservative, but the 
overall strategy is still reformist.
The Third Plenum was clear in promoting the status of the market 
from “basic” to “decisive.” For this and similar moves, Xi and Li are 
considered pragmatists in moving modern China forward another notch.
In Beijing today, much of this pragmatism amounts to letting the 
market determine the economy, allowing the economy to inform governance,
 and ensuring that good governance safeguards society’s interests 
through due public regulation.
That also approximates to the “socialist market economy” Deng 
introduced 35 years ago. Since then, the concept has resulted in moves 
like cutting red tape, cleaning up a messy credit market and 
establishing a free trade zone in Shanghai.
Many suspect the best days of Xi’s presidency are at hand. His 
father is cited as a hero of progressive social development in his time.
Besides the current drive against graft, there is also a campaign 
against pollution. It is serious enough to require productive heavy 
industries like steel to cut capacity, with larger plans to move away 
from polluting sectors in favour of cleaner and more modern industries.
The home-grown company BYD for example not only designs, builds and 
markets its range of electric vehicles, but also plans to produce 
vehicle batteries for automobile companies around the world.
China is not only a large and rapidly growing economy, but one 
focused on the cutting edge of several technologies: ICT, high-speed 
trains and renewable energies among them.
Earlier this month, a skeptical BBC asked whether this latest Third 
Plenum will prove as decisive as the ones in 1978 and 1998. The short 
answer is that it can, depending on the prevailing national interest.
China today differs from the China of Mao’s era in one fundamental 
respect. The state will now do all it can to meet the nation’s current 
and future needs while delivering what the government wants, more than 
simply what the party prefers.
This basic distinction may still escape the understanding of many. 
The recent Third Plenum has gone some way to rectify that, but proof of 
it is already evident in recent years.
The rest will come soon enough. The point is that a transforming 
China with an eye to its future progress has opted for reform not only 
because it wants to, but more because it has to.
Behind The Headlines by Bunn Nagara 
Bunn Nagara is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies (Isis) Malaysia. The views expressed
 are entirely the writer’s own.